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INTRODUCTION 
The STS-56 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report provides a summary of the 
Payloads, as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster 
(SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine 
(SSME) systems performance during the fifty-fourth flight of the Space Shuttle 
Program and sixteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Discovery (OV-103). In 
addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET (ET-54); three 
SSMEfs, which were designated as serial numbers 2024, 2033, and 2018 in 
positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBfs which were designated BI-058. 
The lightweight RSRMfs that were installed in each SRB were designated as 
360L031A for the left SRB and 360L031B for the right SRB. 
The STS-56 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle 
Program requirement, as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E. That 
document states that each major organizational element supporting the Program 
will report the results of their hardware evaluation and mission performance 
plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. 
The primary objective of this flight was to successfully perform the planned 
operations of the ATLAS-2 payload. The secondary objectives of this flight were 
to perform the operations of the Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet 
(SSBW)/A experiment; deploy and retrieve the Shuttle Pointed Autonomous 
Research Tool for Astronomy-201 (SPARTAN-201) payload; and perform the 
operations of the Solar Ultraviolet Experiment (SWE); the Commercial Materials 
Dispersions Apparatus Assembly (CMIX) experiment; the Physiological and 
Anatomical Rodent Experiment (PARE); the Space Tissue Loss (STL) experiment; the 
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-I1 (SAREX-11); the Hand-Held, Earth-Oriented, 
Real-time, Cooperative, User-Friendly, Location-Targeting and Environmental 
System (HERCULES) experiment; the Air Force Maui Optical Site Calibration Test 
(AMOS); the Cosmic Ray Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM) experiment; and 
the Radiation Monitoring Equipment-I11 (RME-111). In addition to the primary 
and secondary objectives assigned to STS-56, 13 Development Test Objectives 
(DTOfs) and 15 Detailed Supplementary Objectives (DSOfs) were assigned to the 
flight. 
The sequence of events for the STS-56 mission is shown in Table I, the official 
Orbiter and GFE Projects Problem Tracking List is shown in Table 11, and the 
official MSFC In-flight Anomaly List is shown in Table 111. In addition, the 
Integration and Payload in-flight anomalies are referenced in the applicable 
sections of the report. Appendix A lists the sources of data, both formal and 
informal, that were used in the preparation of this document. Appendix B 
provides the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. 
All times given in this report are in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) as well as 
mission elapsed time (MET). 
The STS-56 mission was planned as an 8-day mission with an additional day being 
highly desirable. This additional day capability was determined in real-time 
based on consumables with mission planning accommodating the longer duration 
wherever appropriate. A large number of experiments were completed during the 
mission by the five-member crew that was divided into two teams, red and blue, 
so that scientific operations were performed around the clock. 
_-. 
In addition to presenting a summary of subsystem performance, this report also 
discusses the payload operations and results, as well as each in-flight anomaly 
that was assigned to each major element (Orbiter, SSME, ET, SRB, and RSRM). 
Listed in the discussion of each anomaly in the applicable subsection of the 
report is the officially assigned tracking number as published by each 
respective Project Office in their respective Problem Tracking List. 
The crew for this fifty-fourth flight of the Space Shuttle was Kenneth D. 
Cameron, Col., USMC, Commander; Stephen S. Oswald, Civilian, Pilot; Michael 
Foale, Ph.D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 1; Kenneth D. Cockrell, Civilian, 
Mission Specialist 2; Ellen Ochoa, Ph.D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 3. 
STS-56 was be the second space flight for the Commander, Pilot, and Mission 
Specialist 1, and the first space flight for Mission Specialist 2 and Mission 
Specialist 3. 
MISSION SUMMARY 
The first launch attempt of STS-56 was aborted on April 6, 1993, at T-11 seconds 
in the countdown. The countdown had proceeded satisfactorily until the 
T-9 minute hold. At that time, the discussions of the higher than previously 
experienced temperature on the SSME 1 anti-flood valve had not been completed 
and the countdown was held for 60 minutes while these discussions were 
satisfactorily completed. The countdown was picked up at 096:06:23:00 G.m.t., 
and the countdown continued until the abort was called at T-11 seconds. The -. 
abort was called because the hydrogen high-point bleed valve close indication 
was not on when polled at the T-21 second point in the countdown, and the lack 
of the indication is a violation of the Launch Commit Criteria (LCC). Analysis 
of the data showed that the valve had actually closed; however, the closed 
indication failed to register. Because the valve worked properly during the 
first countdown as well as during a leak check of the valve after the abort, a 
decision was made to launch the vehicle on April 8, 1993, with the valve 
indication masked in the ground launch sequencer (GLS). A confidence check of 
the valve operation was also performed during the second countdown and the valve 
again worked properly. After SSME ignition at T-3.5 seconds during the second 
launch attempt, the high-point bleed valve close indication returned. 
The second launch attempt was completed satisfactorily after an exemplary 
countdown with no unplanned holds. Lift-off occurred on-time at 
098:05:28:59.986 G.m.t. (12:29:00 a.m. c.d.t.) on April 8, 1993. All subsystems 
performed satisfactorily throughout the ascent phase except the flash evaporator 
system (FES) which shut down at 98:05:33:16 G.m.t. (00:04:16 MET) while 
operating on the A controller. The crew manually restarted the FES on the 
primary A controller, and it operated satisfactorily thereafter. The OV-103 FES 
experienced shutdowns on previous missions because of the mid-point sensor block 
design, and.this occurrence was not unexpected. 
A determination of the overall vehicle propulsion performance during ascent was 
made using vehicle acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data. First 
stage ascent performance was satisfactory in all respects. Performance of the 
SSMErs, ET, and the main propulsion system was normal. The average .- 
flight-derived SSME specific impulse (Isp) that was determined for the time 
period between SRB separation and the start of 3g throttling was 452.5 seconds 
as compared to an average value for that period of 452.83 seconds. 
The orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 2 maneuver was satisfactorily performed 
with ignition at 98:06:06:07.7 G.m.t. (00:00:37:07 MET). The maneuver was 
150.63 seconds in duration with a differential velocity (AV) of 253.8 ft/sec. 
The resulting orbit was 160 by 159 nmi. 
At 98:06:46:51 G.m.t. (00:01:17:51 MET), the fuel cell 1 oxygen reactant valve 
indication showed the valve to be closed; however, the fuel cell continued to 
operate properly, confirming an instrumentation-only failure. Because of this 
indication, the crew tied busses A and B together. Subsequently, busses A and B 
were untied and busses A and C were tied to more evenly distribute the 
electrical loads. This same indication was received on a previous flight of 
this vehicle (STS-48). Fuel cell 1 will be shut down on the next OV-103 mission 
(STS-51) as a part of a DTO, because a false close indication would affect the 
performance of this DTO. The valve has been replaced in preparation for the 
STS-51 mission. 
The payload bay doors were opened as planned with both doors in the open 
position at 098:07:04:13 G.m.t. (00:01:35:13 MET). 
At 098:14:30 G.m.t. (00:09:01 MET), the thermal impulse printer system (TIPS) 
[(developed to replace both the Text and Graphics System (TAGS) and teleprinter] 
- was not producing an output when the ground was transmitting via the graphics 
mode (Ku-band). An in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure to troubleshoot 
problems with the TIPS was performed. The light indicator showing whether the 
clock signal was being received by TIPS from the Ku-band signal processor (KUSP) 
was initially off and then illuminated later. TIPS must receive a clock signal 
from the KUSP to operate properly. A subsequent TIPS test via Ku-band was 
successful. 
Initially, the Ku-band mode 1 [phase modulation (PM)] channel 3 return link data 
quality was degraded. Preliminary troubleshooting indicated that mode 1 
operated on low-data-rate high-rate multiplexer (HRM) data, but did not operate 
on high-rate HRM data (Flight Problem STS-56-1-01), The operational data are 
satisfactory regardless of the data rate being transmitted. Also, the frequency 
modulation (FM) mode was functioning properly. Much of the equipment in the 
signal processor is common between the PM and FM modes. As a result of this 
problem, new custom test formats for formats 27, 28, 29, and 30 were developed; 
however, no improvement in Ku-band operations was achieved with these formats. 
Ku-band downlink was tested in format 11 (32 Mbps) on channel 3 in the PL 
maximum mode data rate while equipment was powered down to perform an 
electromagnetic interference test. Channel 3 data were again degraded, and the 
channel 2 link was good. 
A Ku-band payload maximum baseline test was performed from 106:03:00 to 
106:04:10 G.m.t. (07:21:31 to 07:22:41 MET). After the Spacelab was 
-. 
reactivated, further troubleshooting was performed in an attempt to narrow the 
data transmittal problem to a specific payload. Results of these tests 
indicated that the Ku-band was operating satisfactorily. 
The SPARTAN payload was successfully deployed at 101:06:11 G.m.t.(03:00:42 MET). 
The remote manipulator system (RMS) was used to deploy SPARTAN and the RMS 
performed nominally. Three reaction control system (RCS) maneuvers were 
performed for SPARTAN separation and the RCS also performed nominally. 
Ku-band radar tracked SPARTAN from 270 feet at 101:06:22 until the system was 
reconfigured to the communication mode at 101:07:05 G.m.t., when SPARTAN was at 
3000 feet. There were no dropouts and the radar was still locked when the 
system was switched to the communications mode. 
The Laser Range and Range Rate Device DTO was performed during the SPARTAN 
deployment. The Laser Technology Incorporated (LTI) component was used for 
short-range tracking and performed well. The Mini Eyesafe Laser Infrared 
Observation Set (MELIOS) was used for longer range (minimum range is specified 
as 50 m/150 ft). The MELIOS range measurement deviated from the Ku measurement 
as the Orbiter moved away from the SPARTAN. 
A digital autopilot (DAP)/universal pointing discrepancy occurred during Solar 
Ultraviolet Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SUSIM) operations (Flight Problem 
STS-56-1-02). The SUSIM experiment attempted to measure electromagnetic 
activity from the Sun. After the desired pointing configuration with respect to 
the Sun's limb was established with the DAP in inertial hold, the universal 
pointing total error in roll started building at a rate of approximately 
0.04 degree/minute. This build-up was unexpected as the universal pointing 
required attitude and inertial hold attitudes should both be held constant. The 
DAP attitude errors were maintained within deadbands throughout the - 
inertial-hold period. 
To begin rendezvous operations for retrieval of the SPARTAN payload, two 
RCS firings were performed with the left OMS interconnected to the RCS. A 
nominal slow rate (NSR) maneuver was performed at 102:05:50 G.m.t. 
(04:00:21 MET) using -X thrusters to achieve a 3.1 ft/sec velocity change. 
The nominal plane change (NPC) maneuver was performed at 102:07:28 G.m.t. 
(04:01:59 MET) to achieve a 2.9 ft/sec velocity change. The right OMS was fired 
to perform a nominal correction (NC1) maneuver at 102:09:40 G.m.t. 
(04:04:11 MET). The maneuver lasted 8 seconds and achieved a velocity change of 
7.1 ft/sec. 
A dual supply and waste water dump was performed beginning at approximately 
101:19:42 G.m.t. (03:14:13 MET). Thirty-five lb of supply water was dumped; 
concurrently, 121 lb of waste water was dumped. The RMS wrist camera was used 
to record video of the water dump from initiation until approximately 75 minutes 
after dump termination. The video was recorded as an aid in troubleshooting 
post-dump expulsions (burps) of water from the supply line which have been 
observed on three OV-103 flights and one OV-104 flight. Data review indicates 
that two supply water vburpsll occurred following the water dump within 1.5 hours 
of supply water dump valve closure. A review of the video verified water 
emission associated with the first occurrence, but video was terminated prior to 
the second occurrence. 
A successful rendezvous with the SPARTAN was completed, and the SPARTAN was 
grappled with the RMS at 103:07:19:45 G.m.t. (05:01:50:45 MET). Final latching - 
of the SPARTAN in the payload bay was completed at 103:08:01:38 G.m.t. 
(05:02:32:28 MET). Ku-band radar tracking of the SPARTAN during the rendezvous 
/. 
sequence began intermittently at 149,000 ft with solid lock-on achieved at 
130,000 ft and held until 90 ft. The LTI device was used for tracking at ranges 
from 1193 ft with good results. The MELIOS device was also used during 
rendezvous with satisfactory results. The crew replaced the MELIOS battery 
after the SPARTAN deployment operations. Low battery voltage was a possible 
cause of the inaccurate readings during the SPARTAN deployment; however, the 
crew reported that they had given a low priority to the distance callouts 
because of the heavy workload during deployment operations. 
Following SPARTAN retrieval, the RMS was stowed for the remainder of the 
mission. The RMS performed nominally throughout the flight. 
The flight control system (FCS) checkout was completed satisfactorily at 
104:06:55:33 G.m.t. (06:01:26:33 MET). Auxiliary power unit (APU) 1 consumed 
13 lb of fuel during the 4 minutes 20 seconds of satisfactory operation. All 
hydraulics functions were nominal during the checkout, and no water spray 
cooling was required. 
The Freon coolant loop (FCL) 2 flow proportioning valve (FPV) was returned to 
the interchanger position to aid in cooling the cabin for entry. The water 
coolant loop 2 temperature controller was returned to the auto position to 
obtain data on the performance of the water bypass valve with one FPV in Payload 
and the other in Interchanger. 
All landing opportunities for Friday, April 16, were waved-off because of 
.-. unacceptable weather conditions at KSC. Landing was planned for the first 
opportunity at KSC on April 17. 
An RCS -X orbit adjust firing was performed satisfactorily at 
106:06:03:00 G.m.t. (08:00:34:00 MET) using forward thrusters F1F and F2F. The 
firing duration was 56 seconds and the hV was 15 ft/sec. The purpose of the 
firing was to improve the entry programmed test input (PTI) crossrange 
opportunity for the second KSC landing opportunity on April 16. 
The RCS hot-fire test was subsequently performed at 106:06:19:40 G.m.t. 
(08:00:50:40 MET). The data review from the test showed that thruster L3L had a 
low chamber pressure (16 psia) for the first 240 ms of the first 400 ms pulse. 
The second pulse was nominal. Possible causes are being evaluated; however, no 
concern existed for the continued operation of this thruster. 
The crew reported a glob of water of about two ounces was on a portion of the 
water loop 2 inlet line to the cabin heat exchanger that had no insulation. The 
water was most probably the result of condensation, as there were no indications 
of a leak. 
The cell performance monitor (CPM) differential voltage readings for fuel cell 1 
substack 3 demonstrated a trend whereby the readings increased during reactant 
purging and gradually decreased between purges. The increase during purges was 
a few millivolts larger with each succeeding purge. Analysis of the data 
pointed to plugging of the reactant ports in one or more of the cells of 
substack 3. Since the performance of the fuel cell was otherwise normal, no 
.- . additional purges of that fuel cell were made. Because of fuel cell shutdown 
operations planned for fuel cell 1 on the next flight of this vehicle, the 
decision was made to replace this fuel cell. 
Both payload bay doors were closed nominally by 107:07:59:54 G.m.t. 
(08:02:30:54 MET). The deorbit maneuver was performed at 107:10:34:25.3 G.m.t. 
(09:05:05:25.3 MET). The maneuver was approximately 208.2 seconds in duration 
and the AV was 378.7 ft/sec. Entry interface occurred at 107:11:05:53 G.m.t. 
(09:05:36:53 MET). All programmed test inputs (PTI's) were performed as 
planned. 
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at the Shuttle Landing Facility on concrete 
runway 33 at 107:11:37:19 G.m.t. (09:06:08:19 MET) on April 17, 1993. Nose 
landing gear touchdown occurred 15 seconds after main gear touchdown with the 
Orbiter drag chute being deployed satisfactorily at 107:11:37:30.8 G.m.t. The 
drag chute was jettisoned at 107:11:38:00 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at 
107:11:38:22 G.m.t. Preliminary indications are that the rollout was normal in 
all respects. The flight duration was 9 days 6 hours 8 minutes 24 seconds. All 
three APU's were powered down by 107:11:53:20 G.m.t. The crew completed the 
required postflight reconfigurations and departed the Orbiter landing area at 
107:12:48 G.m.t. 
PAYLOADS 
The payloads carried on STS-56 consisted of the ATLAS-2; the SPARTAN-201; the 
SWE; the HERCULES; the RME-111; the CREAM; the AMOS; and the SAREX-11. In 
addition, more than 30 investigations were flown as a part of the Commercial 
Materials Dispersion Apparatus (MDA) Instrumentation Technology Associates (ITA) -. 
experiments. Three in-flight anomalies were identified from the Payloads data 
and these anomalies are discussed in the appropriate area of the Payloads 
section of this report. 
The primary payload for STS-56 was the second in NASA's series of Atmospheric 
Laboratory for Applications and Science-2 (ATLAS-2) Spacelab missions, which 
consisted of remote-sensing laboratory studies of the Sun's energy output and 
Earth's middle-atmosphere chemical make-up, and how these factors affect levels 
of ozone. Ozone depletion has been a serious environmental concern since the 
1970ts, and in the mid-1980's British scientists observed significant ozone 
depletion of the Antarctic. Scientists from five nations participated directly 
with the U. S. in the ATLAS-2 mission, underscoring the worldwide importance of 
atmospheric and solar research. In addition to the United States, investigators 
represented Belgium, Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
The open, U-shaped pallet-type reusable Spacelab equipment provided by the 
European Space Agency (ESA) in 1981 as it contribution to the Space Shuttle 
Program had six instruments mounted on it in the payload bay. A seventh 
instrument was mounted in two get-away special (GAS) canisters on the walls of 
the payload bay. These seven instruments were divided into two major areas of 
science - atmospheric and solar. A teacher's guide entitled, Atmospheric 
Detectives, was developed for use with middle school students to complement and 
teach science objectives of the ATLAS-2 mission. 
-. 
Activation of the ATLAS-2 payload was completed at 098:09:19:00 G.m.t. 
(00:03:50 MET). The ATLAS-2 provided data on the composition and chemical 
processes of the middle atmosphere. It measured atmospheric constituents, solar 
radiation, and total solar irradiance. The night launch provided the ATLAS-2 
scientists a unique opportunity to make detailed measurements in the Arctic 
stratosphere. Additionally, atmospheric data were collected over 94 percent of 
the Earth. The solar observations provided scientists with information on the 
solar energy that drives Earth's climate system, and the photochemistry of ozone 
in the stratosphere. The data collected will ultimately be placed in the Earth 
Observing System Data Information System archives at Goddard Space Flight Center 
where it will be available to atmospheric scientists around the world. 
The ATLAS I1 and Spacelab were both able to take advantage of the weather-added 
day in space. Five of the seven ATLAS-2 experiments were repowered to gather 
data during that extra day. As a result, the final ATLAS-2 power down occurred 
at 107:05:33 G.m.t. (09:00:04 MET). All Principal Investigators for the ATLAS-2 
experiments considered the mission to have been very successful. 
Atmospheric Science 
Atmospheric Trace Molecule Spectroscopy.- The Atmospheric Trace Molecule 
Spectroscopy (ATMOS) experiment identified the distribution, by altitude, of 
30 to 40 different gases between 6 and 85 miles (10 and 140 kilometers) above 
the Earth's surface. This experiment made most of its measurements in the 
Southern Hemisphere during the first mission (ATLAS-1) it was flown, and to 
-. focus on the Northern Hemisphere during the ATLAS-2 mission required the night 
launch. This experiment was sponsored by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the 
United States. 
A problem with the transmission of high-rate data initially caused some loss of 
all experiment data; however, the problem was overcome with the use of a new 
downlink format. This format allowed the data team to maximize the use of the 
high data rate recorder (HDRR) to provide near-real-time data evaluation during 
the mission. Additionally, the new ATMOS recorder that was located in the 
payload bay was used to record over 100 sunrise/sunset observations, which made 
the ATMOS experiment a major success. This recorder will be used on all future 
ATLAS missions. 
The ATMOS instrument experienced an anomaly with the loss of one phase of the 
three-phase cooler compressor on flight day 3. Preliminary indications were 
that ice crystal contamination in the expansion area of the compressor caused 
the anomaly. The cooling capacity of the instrument was unaffected and the 
instrument performed well for the remainder of the mission. 
Millimeter Wave Atmospheric Sounder.- The Millimeter Wave Atmospheric Sounder 
(MAS) experiment measured water vapor, ozone and chlorine monoxide (a key 
compound that contributes to ozone loss), as well as temperature and pressure in 
the middle atmosphere. This experiment was sponsored by the Institute for 
Aeronomy of Germany. 
The MAS science team was able to overcome an early-mission problem with the 
....~ pointing system by modifying the onboard software. Preliminary analyses of 
these data show high quality chlorine monoxide, ozone, and water vapor profile 
information. Data were collected in both the northern and southern hemispheres. 
Initial analysis by the MAS team shows that the MAS data are of better quality -. 
than from the ATLAS-1 mission. These data will provide better spatial 
resolution for the chlorine monoxide, ozone, and water vapor profile 
information. 
Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet Spectrometer.- The Shuttle Solar 
Backscatter Ultraviolet (SSBW) Spectrometer experiment, mounted in two gas 
canisters on the walls of the payload bay, measured ozone concentrations-by 
comparing solar ultraviolet radiation with that scattered back from the Earth's 
atmosphere. This experiment was sponsored by the Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC) of the United States. 
The minimum observing requirements were exceeded by more than 100 percent. 
Preliminary analysis of the data shows a decrease in northern mid-latitude 
ozone. These data are consistent with recent analysis of satellite data. The 
instrument also observed sulfur dioxide concentrations over urban and industrial 
areas of the eastern United States, Europe, and eastern Asia. The additional 
day of operations provided the instrument with the unique opportunity to measure 
nitric oxide gamma bands, which will provide information of mesospheric nitric 
oxide. The additional time also allowed the instrument to measure how much 
ultraviolet radiation is actually reaching the Earth. 
After initial data evaluation, the Principal Investigator team has reported that 
all of the observational objectives for the flight were met and many were 
exceeded. The instrument performance, data acquisition, and operations went 
exceedingly well, and scientific observations were conducted that have never 
been accomplished, such as that of tropospheric sulfur dioxide. 
Solar Science 
Solar Spectrum.- The Solar Spectrum (SOLSPEC) Measurement experiment studied 
the distribution of solar energy by wavelength (infrared to ultraviolet). This 
experiment was sponsored by the National Center for Scientific Research of 
France. 
Remote operation of the SOLSPEC instrument from the Brussels, Belgium control 
center was very successful. SOLSPEC collected correlative data with a similar 
instrument aboard the free-flying European Carrier Satellite (EURECA). As a 
result, solar variability studies were conducted because the solar activity 
decreased between the ATLAS-1 and ATLAS-2 flights. The investigation team has 
expressed extreme satisfaction over the operation of the instrument and the 
scientific return the measurements have provided. 
Solar Ultraviolet Irradiance Monitor.- The Solar Ultraviolet Irradiance Monitor 
(SUSIM) experiment concentrated on the Sun's ultraviolet radiation which 
undergoes wider variations than other wavelengths. This experiment was 
sponsored by the Naval Research Laboratory of the United States. 
The SUSIM instrument collected solar data and sunrise/sunset occultation during 
each of the solar pointing orbits. This primary solar science objective was 
performed to make comparisons with the SUSIM instrument on the Upper Atmosphere 
Research Satellite (UARS). These comparisons will allow scientist to make the .-. 
necessary corrections to the UARS data that are essential for tracking subtle 
h 
changes in the atmospheric condition and the solar energy which influences them. 
The SUSIM also met a secondary objective by capturing the sunrise/sunset 
occultations to obtain ozone profiles. 
The SUSIM investigation team considers the ATLAS-2 flight to be clearly the most 
successful mission for the SUSIM instrument. The data are being used to obtain 
ozone density profiles, as well as compare and validate the performance of 
previous SUSIM flights. 
Active Cavity Radiometer and Solar Constant.- The Active Cavity Radiometer 
(ACR) and the Solar Constant (SOLCON) experiments each made direct and precise 
independent measurements of the totai energy Earth receives from the sun. The 
ACR experiment was sponsored by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the United 
States, and the SOLCON experiment was sponsored by the Belgian Royal Institute 
of Meteorology of Belgium. 
The ACR experiment had two premission goals and both were met. The instrument 
made correlative measurements with UARS and performed as many solar constant 
measurements as the mission allowed. The ACR instrument performance was 
outstanding as reported by the Principal Investigators. The investigators 
believe that the quality measurements obtained will allow the most stable and 
best ever calibrations with the UARS data. 
The SOLCON experiment was very successfully controlled from Brussels, Belgium. 
The SOLCON Principal Investigator team are presently studying their data in 
-. Belgium. Preliminary solar irradiance measurements show close agreement with 
data received from the EURECA. The science team also reports that very stable 
calibration was achieved between the SOLCON instrument and the instruments on 
the UARS. 
Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Research Tool for Astronomy-201 
The SPARTAN-201 was a free-flying payload that studied the velocity and 
acceleration of the solar wind and observed aspects of the Sun's corona. In 
measuring these phenomena, two telescopes, a White Light Coronagraph (WLC) and 
an Ultraviolet Coronal Spectrometer (WCS), were used. A comparison of the data 
from the two telescopes will for the first time allow scientists to measure the 
temperatures and electron and proton densities in the solar corona. 
The SPARTAN payload was deployed using the RMS during the third day of the 
mission at 101:06:11:33 G.m.t. (03:00:42:33 MET). The crew performed a 
separation maneuver using the RCS and separated the Orbiter to a distance of 
about 172 miles behind the SPARTAN-201. A successful rendezvous with the 
SPARTAN was completed, and the SPARTAN was grappled with the RMS at 
103:07:20:05 G.m.t. (05:01:51:05 MET). Final latching of the SPARTAN in the 
payload bay was completed at 103:08:01:38 G.m.t. (05:02:32:28 MET) in 
preparation for its return to the Earth. 
The SPARTAN-201 was removed from the payload bay and was shipped to GSFC. 
Initial evaluation of the science data tapes has revealed excellent data. Data 
are continuing to be evaluated as the SPARTAN-201 is prepared for its next 
flight on the STS-63 mission. 
Solar Ultraviolet Experiment 
The SUVE provided data on the extreme ultraviolet solar radiation as it affects 
the Earth's ionosphere. The SUVE was housed in a single GAS canister in the 
payload bay. The experiment was designed, managed, and built by students at the 
University of Colorado. 
A total of 22 orbits of solar radiation data were collected with the S W E  
instrument during the four data-take periods. The data collected represents 
more than 16 times the minimum requirements. 
Hand-Held, Earth-Oriented, Real-Time, Cooperative, User-Friendly, 
Location-Targeting and Environmental System 
The HERCULES experiment provided a modified Nikon camera and a geolocation 
device which enabled the crewperson to determine in real-time the latitude and 
longitude of Earth images. STS-56 was the second flight of this experiment that 
was developed by the Department of Defense Space Test Program. 
The HERCULES experiment obtained over 13 disks with over 400 images of data 
during the mission. Initially, the HERCULES experiment experienced some 
problems with the playback/downlink unit (PDU) retaining power (Flight Problem 
STS-56-P-02). The PDU was swapped with a PGSC, but the geolocation information 
was lost. After determining that the power cable was the cause of the power 
problem, the cable was repaired and the PDU was brought back on line. The 
experiment operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. 
During an attempted HERCULES inertial measurement unit (HIMU) alignment on 
flight day 6, two HERCULES attitude processor (HAP) failures occurred, and in 
each case this resulted in the loss of the alignment (Flight Problem 
STS-56-P-03). Loss of the HAP results in the loss of geolocation capability. 
The HAP was reset and a subsequent alignment was successful. The error data 
were saved for postflight analysis. 
Radiation Monitoring Equipment-I11 
The Radiation Monitoring Equipment-I11 (RME-111) experiment was used to measure 
the exposure of ionizing radiation on the Space Shuttle. RUE-I11 displayed the 
dose rate and the total accumulated radiation dose to the operator. The RME-I11 
was flown under the direction of the Department of Defense Space Test Program, 
and was flown in conjunction with other radiation experiments on this flight. 
The RME-I11 was set up on flight day 1 and collected ionizing radiation data 
throughout the mission. The instrument was moved to different preplanned crew 
cabin locations, and operations were nominal. The units were stowed for entry 
as planned. 
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor 
The CREAM experiment was designed to collect cosmic ray energy loss spectra, 
neutron fluxes, and induced radioactivity data. The instruments were set up on 
flight day 1, and the data were collected by the active and passive monitors 
placed at specific locations throughout the Orbiter cabin. The active monitor 
collected data on real-time spectral data, whereas, the passive monitors 
- 
collected data that was analyzed during the postflight period. The CREAM 
experiment was a Department of Defense experiment and was flown under the 
direction of the Space Test Program. 
Air Force Maui Optical Site 
The AMOS is an electro-optical facility located on the island of Maui in the 
Hawaiian Islands. This experiment observed primary RCS thruster firings and 
water dumps as the Orbiter flew over the tracking site. No hardware was 
required onboard the Space Shuttle for this experiment. The RCS firing on 
flight day 8 was observed with both visible and infrared instruments. 
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-I1 
The SAREX-I1 provided public participation in the space program, supports 
educational initiatives and demonstrated the effectiveness of making contact 
between the Space Shuttle and amateur "ham" radio stations on the ground. 
SAREX-I1 provided very satisfactory communications on seven of the past Space 
Shuttle missions, and was used very successfully on this mission by all five - 
crew members. SAREX enabled the first Orbiter to MIR contact on April 10, 1993, 
at 100:23:02 G.m.t. (02:17:32 MET). The crew also contacted all scheduled 
schools that were located in the United States, Britain, Portugal, South Africa, 
and Australia. The amateur television portion of SAREX experienced some 
success with the crew confirming receipt of some of the color-fast scan and some 
- of the slow-scan video transmissions. 
Commercial Materials Dispersion Apparatus ITA Experiments 
In excess of 30 separate investigations were conducted with the Commercial 
Materials Dispersion Apparatus (MDA) Instrumentation Technology Associates (ITA) 
experiments. These experiments enabled the gathering of data for determining 
how microgravity can aid research in drug development and delivery, 
biotechnology, basic cell biology, protein and inorganic crystal growth, bone 
and invertebrate development, immune deficiencies, manufacturing processes, and 
fluid sciences. 
The CMIX hardware consists of four MDA mini-laboratories, which are housed in a 
commercial refrigerator/incubator module. Each of the mini-labs was a 
brick-sized automated device that could bring as many as 100 separate samples of 
multiple fluids and/or solids into contact at precisely timed intervals. In 
addition, live cell investigations were conducted in 10 bioprocessing modules 
(BPM1s), which contain 60 to 100 times more fluid volume than the MDA1s. A 
listing of the experiments contained in the CMIX is as follows: 
Bone cell differentiation 
Immune cell response 
Diatoms 
Mouse bone marrow cells 
Nerve/muscle cell interactions 
Phagocytosis 
Live cell investigations 
Collagen reconstitution 
Microencapsulation 
Urokinase protein crystal growth 
Bacterial aldolase and rabbit muscle aldolase protein crystal growth 
HIV reverse transcriptase 
RNA protein crystal growth 
Methylase protein crystal growth 
Lysozyme protein crystal growth 
DNA-Heme protein crystal growth 
Brine shrimp development 
Cell research 
Mustard seed germination 
Fish egg hatching 
Heart cells in culture 
Mushroom spore generations 
Mustard-spinach seed germination 
Other investigations 
All CMIX operations were on time and nominal. The BPM1s were set up, activated, 
sampled, and restowed with no problems or anomalies. The materials dispersion 
apparatuses (MDA1s) were activated and deactivated according to schedule. 
Space Tissue Loss Experiment 
The objective of the STL experiment was to validate models of muscle, bone, and 
endothelial cell biochemical and functional loss induced by microgravity stress; 
to evaluate cytoskeleton, metabolism, membrane integrity and protease activity .- 
in target cells; and to test tissue loss pharmaceuticals for efficacy. 
Initialization of the STL experiment occurred four hours into the mission. The 
temperatures rose to 4-5 degrees above the normal operating temperature of 3 7 O F  
(Flight Problem STS-56-P-01). On flight day 4, after moving the experiment to 
the airlock to obtain cool air from the "elephant trunktt, the STL temperature 
was successfully dropped to nominal. Operations continued as planned from that 
location. The unit was stowed back in its locker for entry; however, the 
temperature began rising again and the unit was moved to a new locker location 
and the "elephant trunk" cooling was re-established at the new location. The 
STL temperature then went lower than normal, so the Itelephant trunk" was removed 
and stowed for entry. 
Physiological and Anatomical Rodent Experiment 
The PARE is a series of experiments that are designed to determine whether 
exposure to microgravity results in physiological or anatomical changes in 
rodents. The PARE consists of rodents contained within an animal enclosure 
module (AEM), which occupies one middeck locker with a modified locker door. 
The PARE operations were nominal, except for the day/night light on one of the 
two AEMts that was discovered to have lost power. The power was recycled and as 
a result, the light was restored to its operational mode. 
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS/REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTORS 
All SRB systems performed as expected, except the hold down post (HDP) debris 
containment device on HDP 5. The SRB prelaunch countdown was nominal. No SRB 
or redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM) Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or 
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD) 
violations occurred. 
Power up and operation of all case, igniter, and field joint heaters was 
accomplished routinely. All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable 
limits throughout the countdown. For this flight, the low-pressure 
heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was used to maintain the case/nozzle 
joint and flexible bearing temperatures within the required LCC limits. At 
T-15 minutes, the purge was changed to high pressure to inert the aft skirt. 
The plunger and spring from the left SRB aft skirt (HDP 5) debris containment 
device exited the device at lift-off (Flight Problem STS-56-B-1). An 
investigation concluded that during the process of sealing the exit bore in the 
containment device at lift-off, the plunger was struck by the frangible nut 
halves, in turn breaking off four sections of the plunger flange at the edges of 
the flange cutouts. The plunger then impacted the spherical washer causing the 
remaining edges of the plunger flange to fail. The failure provided enough 
clearance for the plunger and spring to exit the debris containment device and 
lodge in the mobile launch platform (MLP) support post. This incident has been 
identified as a random occurrence (1 out of 240 containment device uses) with a 
low probability (0.99998 probability of no HDP debris impact) of debris impact 
to the vehicle, and therefore, this condition is not considered a 
safety-of-flight issue. 
Data indicate that the flight performance of both RSRMrs were well within the 
allowable performance envelopes, and the performance was typical of the 
performance observed on previous flights. The RSRM propellant mean bulk 
temperature (PMBT) was 66OF at lift-off. Both SRBrs were successfully separated 
from the ET 125.8 seconds after lift-off and were recovered and returned to KSC 
for disassembly. The table on the following page presents the RSRM performance 
values. 
During the disassembly process, a small axial scratch (0.04 inch) was observed 
at the 55.8-degree location on the left RSRM aft dome boss primary sealing 
surface (Flight Problem STS-56-M-1). The scratch was 0.58 inch from the forward 
edge of the aft dome boss inside diameter. Raised metal was detected. No 
damage was found on any of the nozzle-to-case joint O-rings, and a preflight 
check provided a positive verification of the joint sealing capability. The 
minimum O-ring footprint of 0.116 inch at 14.49 percent squeeze yields a 
35-percent violation of the minimum O-ring footprint. 
Also during the SRB post-recovery disassembly and inspection, a pair of pliers 
were found in the left-hand SRB skirt. 
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE 
Impulse gaies 
1-20, lo6 lbf-sec 
1-60, lo6 lbf-sec 
I-AT, 10 lbf-sec 
Parameter 
Vacuum Isp, lbf-sec/lbm 
Left motor, 68OF 
Predicted I Actual 
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60°F 
at 625 psia 
Burn rate, in/sec @ 66OF 
at 625 psia 
Event times, seconds 
Ignition interval 
Web t imea 
Separation cue, 50 psia 
Action time 
PMBT, OF 
Maximum ignition rise rate, 
psia/lO ms 
Decay time, seconds 
(59.4 psia to 85 K) 
Tailoff imbalance 
Impulse differential, 
klbf -sec 
Predicted 
N/A 
Actual 
398.95b 
Notes: 
a All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by 
the letter a. These items are referenced to lift-off time (ignition 
interval). 
Tailoff imbalance is equal to left motor minus right motor, and was 
calculated by Marshall Space Flight Center. 
EXTERNAL TANK 
The ET flight performance was excellent. All objectives and requirements 
associated with the ET propellant loading and flight operations were met. All 
ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated satisfactorily. ET purge 
and heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. No MSFC OMRSD 
or LCC violations were identified. 
Typical ice/frost formations for the April atmospheric environment were observed --- 
on the ET during the countdown. Normal quantities of ice or frost were present 
on the liquid oxygen (LO2) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) feedlines and on the 
r. 
pressurization line brackets, and some frost or ice was present along the LH 
protuberance air load (PAL) ramps. These observations were acceptable per 2 
NSTS 08303. No ice or frost was observed on the acreage of the LO2 or the LH2 
tank barrel. 
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and 
flight. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the period of ullage 
pressure slump was 13.9 psid. ET separation was confirmed after a nominal main 
engine cutoff (MECO). 
Post-separation ET photographs taken from the Orbiter in support of DTO 312 
showed approximately 12 divots in the intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout and 
approximately 9 areas of missing foam up to two feet in length from the -2 side 
of the intertank acreage thermal protection system (TPS) application (Flight 
Problem STS-56-T-01). An investigation team was formed to determine the cause 
and corrective action for the occurrence of divots in the intertank TPS 
application. 
ET separation occurred 532.884 seconds after lift-off. ET entry and breakup 
occurred approximately 74 nmi. uprange of the preflight predicted point and 
within the predicted footprint. 
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES 
All SSME parameters were normal throughout the prelaunch countdown and were 
- typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights, except for the 
SSME-1 (2024) LO2 anti-flood valve (AFV) skin temperature measurement. During 
propellant loading for both the launch scrub on April 6 and the launch on April 
8, the AFV skin temperature measurement on SSME-1 read approximately 60°F warmer 
than expected on channels A and B (Flight Problem STS-56-E-1). This did not 
cause an LCC or OMRSD violation, but a concern for debonded skin temperature 
sensors was raised. It was considered safe to proceed with the countdown and 
launch after an LCC deviation was created to monitor the AFV skin temperature 
and gaseous oxygen (GO ) interface temperature for small temperature changes 
during the final secon s of the countdown to assure that the AFV was not 
leaking. 
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Engine "ready" was achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine 
start and thrust buildup was normal. 
Flight data indicated that the SSME performance during mainstage, throttling, 
shutdown and propellant dump operations was normal. Engine cutoff times from 
the time of engine start were 520.64, 520.77, and 520.89 seconds for SSME 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively. The high pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high 
pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures appeared to be well within 
specification throughout engine operation. The Isp was rated as 452.50 seconds 
based on trajectory data. SSME MECO occurred at 514.312 seconds after lift-off. 
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM 
All 24 of the Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) performed successfully. The 
- SRSS closed-loop testing was completed as scheduled during the launch countdown. 
-. 
All SRSS safe-and-arm (S&A) devices were armed and system inhibits were turned 
off at the appropriate times. All SRSS measurements indicated that the system 
operated as expected throughout the countdown and flight. 
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power was turned off 
prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation from 
the Orbiter. 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS PERFORMANCE 
Main Propulsion System 
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was as expected with 
the exception of the LH2 high point bleed valve position indicator failure 
discussed in the following paragraph. 
The countdown on the first launch attempt was picked up at T-9 minutes and was 
scrubbed at T-11 seconds when the MPS LH2 high-point bleed valve (PV22) closed 
position indicator failed off (did not indicate closure of the valve during the 
T-21-second poll), and this is an LCC violation (Flight Problem STS-56-V-01). 
Analysis of the data showed that the valve had actually closed; however, the 
closed indication was never transmitted. This was based on the loss of open 
power, loss of the open indicator, and the immediate temperature rise shown by 
the downstream facility transducer. During the LH2 drain, the valve was cycled 
five times to monitor indicators and temperatures. The closed indication was 
never received, but the downstream temperature showed nominal performance for .- 
each cycle (rising to an off-scale high temperature of -408.8OF in about 
8 seconds). The valve was successfully cycled again during the loading for the 
second launch attempt, but again the valve-closed indication was not received. 
As a result, an LCC waiver was approved to mask out the PV22 closed position 
indicator in the GLS. During the second launch attempt which lead to a 
successful launch, the high-point bleed valve (PV22) closed indication returned 
at T-3.5 seconds during the engine start sequence. The valve also worked 
properly during the vacuum inerting and showed a nominal response. 
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas 
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the 
Orbiter aft compartment (which occurred shortly after the start of the LH2 
recirculation pumps) was approximately 147 ppm (corrected), which compares 
favorably with previous data for this vehicle. 
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus 
the inventory loads resulted in a nominal loading accuracy of +0.01 percent for 
LHZ and +0.06 percent for LO2. 
Ascent MPS performance was completely normal in all respects. Data indicate 
that the LO2 and LH2 pressurization systems performed as planned, and that all 
net positive suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the 
flight. The GO fixed orifice and GH2 pressurization systems performed as 
predicted. ~va3uation of the flow control valve data revealed no problems. 
The MPS helium system performed as expected and met all requirements during -. 
powered flight, propellant dumping, and vacuum inerting operations. During 
entry, helium consumption was nominal with approximately 58.0 lb used. 
Reaction Control Subsystem 
The RCS operated satisfactorily throughout the mission with 4656.1 lbm of 
propellants used during the mission. The RCS was interconnected to the OMS 
while on-orbit and 8.26 percent of the left OMS propellants and 6.92 percent of 
the right OMS propellants were used by the RCS. The RCS performed 10 firings 
during the mission in support of the mission objectives. 
The RCS was used to impart pitch, yaw, and roll maneuvers in support of DTO 251 
(Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test) during entry. The forward RCS was 
dumped to near zero late in the entry phase as planned. 
Rendezvous operations for retrieval of the SPARTAN payload were completed with 
RCS maneuvers. Two RCS firings were performed with the left OMS interconnected 
to the RCS. A nominal slow rate (NSR) maneuver was performed at 
102:05:50 G.m.t. (04:00:21 MET) using -X thrusters to achieve a 3.1 ft/sec 
velocity change. Nominal plane change (NPC) was performed at 102:07:28 G.m.t. 
(04:01:59 MET) to achieve a 2.9 ft/sec velocity change. 
An RCS -X orbit adjust firing was performed satisfactorily at 
106:06:03:00 G.m.t. (08:00:34:00 MET) using forward thrusters F1F and F2F. The 
firing duration was 56 seconds and the AV was 15 ft/sec. The purpose of the 
firing was to improve the entry PTI crossrange opportunity for the second KSC 
landing opportunity on April 16. 
-- During the RCS hot-fire test performed at 106:06:19:40 G.m.t. (08:00:50:40 MET) 
following the flight control system checkout, the chamber pressure for the first 
pulse of thruster L3L was low (approximately 16 psia) for approximately the 
first 240 ms of the 400 ms pulse. The second pulse was nominal. The chamber 
pressure recovered fully and the thruster operated nominally for the remainder 
of the mission. 
During deorbit preparations, the oxidizer and fuel temperatures for RCS vernier 
thruster L5D was 30 to 40°F warmer than the other vernier thrusters. This 
behavior was interpreted as a failed-on 10W thruster heater (Flight Problem 
STS-56-V-13). The thruster was also exhibiting slower cooling than the other 
thrusters when the heaters were turned off prior to entry. Data evaluation 
revealed that the LSD injector temperatures were off-scale high for the majority 
of the mission. The thruster will be replaced during turnaround operations. 
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem 
The OMS performance was very satisfactory throughout the mission with three 
maneuvers performed as planned. The total firing time for the left OMS engine 
was 356.1 seconds and for the right OMS engine was 364.1 seconds. A total of 
15861 lb of propellants were used during the mission. The RCS was 
interconnected to the OMS while on-orbit and 8.26 percent of the left OMS 
propellants and 6.92 percent of the right OMS propellants were used by the RCS. 
Inlet pressures, chamber pressures, and regenerative jacket temperatures for 
both engines were as expected. OMS firing times and propellant consumption were 
consistent with predictions. 
The right OMS was fired to perform a nominal correction (NC1) maneuver at 
102:09:40 G.m.t. (04:04:11 MET). The maneuver lasted 8 seconds and achieved a 
velocity change of 7.1 ft/sec. 
During propellant loading, it was noted that the left-hand fuel gage was biased 
high, and this is indicative of a problem in the aft probe or the totalizer. 
This bias did not affect mission operations. 
The following table presents the pertinent parameters for each firing. 
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem 
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem operated nominally 
with 29.1 hours of mission extension capability remaining based on an average 
power level of 15.7 kW. The vehicle was flown in the four-tank set 
configuration. A total of 2485.1 lb of oxygen, including the 69.7 lb used by 
the crew, was consumed. Also 304.2 lb of hydrogen was used. 
OMS 
firing 
2 
3 
Deorbit 
A test was conducted to determine the minimum amount of unusable oxygen and 
hydrogen by driving the tank 4 heaters to the Shuttle Operational Data Book 
(SODB) limits. The limits are defined at 350°F for the oxygen heater, 200°F for 
the hydrogen heater, and 160°F for the oxygen and hydrogen fluid. The oxygen 
tank fluid reached 160°F with a residual quantity of 5.5 percent instead of the 
6.5 percent at normal operating conditions and a heater temperature of 250°F 
before deactivating the oxygen tank heater. The hydrogen tank 4 quantity 
reached a minimum of 0.7 percent instead of the normal 2.5 percent residual 
quantity without reaching either the heater or the fluid temperature limits. 
The hydrogen tank 4 heaters were deactivated when the heater temperature reached 
160°F and the fluid temperature reached O°F. This test demonstrated that by 
raising the heater and fluid temperatures to near the SODB limits of the 
hydrogen and oxygen tanks, more usable cryogenics could be depleted from the 
tanks. Thus, the fuel cell subsystem could have an extra amount of cryogenics 
for power generation. 
Time, G.m.t./MET 
98:06:06:08.2 G.m.t. 
00:00:37:18.2.MET 
102:09:39:37.5 G.m.t. 
04:04:10:37.5 MET 
107:10:34:25.5 G.m.t. 
08:05:05:25.5 MET 
Engine 
used 
Both 
Right 
Both 
Firing 
duration, 
sec 
148.8 
8.0 
208.1 
Av 9 
ft/sec 
253.6 
6.8 
378.7 
Fuel Cell Power~lant Subsvstem 
The fuel cell powerplant subsystem operated nominally throughout the mission, 
supplying 3497 kwh of electrical energy. In generating this amount of 
electricity, the fuel cells also produced 2719.6 lb of water. 
At 98:06:46:51 G.m.t. (00:01:17:51 MET), the fuel cell 1 oxygen reactant valve 
indication showed the valve to be closed; however, the fuel cell continued to 
operate properly, confirming an instrumentation-only failure (Flight Problem 
STS-56-V-02). Because of this indication, the crew tied busses A and B 
together. Subsequently, busses A and B were untied and busses A and C were tied 
together to more evenly distribute electrical loads. The oxygen reactant valve 
was closed during postlanding operations for fuel cell shut down. Subsequently, 
the reactant valve was opened for inerting the fuel cells and the indicator 
worked properly. The valve panel that has the anomalous valve will be replaced 
during the next turnaround. Fuel cell 1 will be shut down on the next OV-103 
mission (STS-51) as a part of a DTO, because a false close indication would 
affect the performance of this DTO. This same indication was received on a 
previous flight of this vehicle (STS-48). 
Six fuel cell purges were performed during the mission at 24, 67, 115, 160, 191, 
and 215 hours MET. The flight rule for fuel cell purging for this mission was 
to purge every 72 hours or when a 0.2 V degradation was reached by any fuel 
cell. A voltage decay of 0.2 V was noted every other day on fuel cell 1, 
necessitating a purge prior to the 72-hour goal. Fuel cell 1 reached the 
-. 0.2 volt voltage decay limit earlier than planned because the reactant inerts 
were above historical levels of facility reactants, although the levels were 
well within specification. In addition, fuel cell 1 supplied 33 percent more 
power than either fuel cell 2 or fuel cell 3 due to the Orbiter load 
distribution. 
Late in the flight, the cell performance monitor (CPM) differential voltage 
readings for fuel cell 1 substack 3 demonstrated a trend whereby the readings 
increased during reactant purging and gradually decreased between purges (Flight 
Problem STS-56-V-12). The increase during purges was a few millivolts larger 
with each succeeding purge. Analysis of the data pointed to plugging of the 
reactant ports in one or more of the cells of substack 3. Since the performance 
of the fuel cell was otherwise normal, no additional purges of that fuel cell 
were made. Because of fuel cell shutdown operations planned for fuel cell 1 on 
the next flight of this vehicle, the decision was made to replace this fuel cell 
during turnaround operations. 
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem 
The APU subsystem performed nominally throughout the mission, and no problems or 
in-flight anomalies were recorded. The table on the following page presents the 
APU run times and fuel consumption by APU serial number and position. 
Approximately 3 minutes after APU shutdown following ascent, the system 1 fuel 
test line temperature 1 violated the lower fault detection annunciator (FDA) 
limit of 48OF, requiring the early activation of the fuel/tank/line/water system 
A heaters. The test line temperatures returned to the normal range once the 
heaters began to cycle. This is a recurring problem, and efforts are underway 
to resolve this condition. 
Launch Scrub 1 5:39( 19 
Ascent 121:411 54 
FCS checkout I 4:201 13 
IAPU 
Time, 
min: sec 
a Entry 
(S/N 406) 1 IAPU 3 (S/N 404) 
Fuel I Time. I Fuel 
60:01) 118 
consumption, min:sec consumption, 
lb lb 
I I 
Notes: 
a The IAPU's ran for 16 minutes 7 seconds after landing (touchdown). 
After ascent, all three APU fuel service line temperature measurements cycled 
higher than the initial FDA limit, requiring the upper FDA limit of 100°F to be 
raised in real time to 140°F for all three APUts to prevent nuisance alarms. 
This condition occurred on the previous flight of this vehicle after the sensors 
were relocated without changing the FDA limits. Efforts are underway to raise 
the FDA limits. 
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem 
The hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem performed very satisfactorily. 
Operations during ascent and on-orbit were nominal with no circulation pump 
operations during the mission. Also, no spray cooling was experienced during 
the FCS checkout because the APU was operated for less than 5 minutes. 
Prior to the first launch attempt, the WSB 2 core temperature lagged those of 
WSB 1 and 3 while the APUts were running. This lag of the WSB 2 core 
temperature behind those of WSBts 1 and 3 was also repeated during the STS-56 
launch. When WSB water boiling occurred shortly after launch, the WSB 2 core 
temperature caught up with systems 1 and 3. 
WSB 1 displayed a slight undercooling condition (268OF lubrication oil return 
temperature) and overcooling condition during ascent. However, temperatures 
remained well within the allowable limits. 
WSB 2 had a minor overcooling condition of APU lubrication oil return after SSME 
repositioning during entry. This was a 20°F temperature drop that recovered 
after one minute, and this is a violation of the in-flight checkout 
requirements. The condition is a repeat of the WSB 2 system problem that 
occurred during the entry phase of STS-53. 
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem 
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed 
nominally throughout the mission with no problems noted. Because the fuel cell 
1 oxygen reactant valve indication showed the valve to be closed, main buses A 
--. 
and B were tied together as a precautionary measure and to ensure that a main 
bus would not be lost. Later in the flight, buses A and B were untied and buses 
A and C were tied together to more evenly distribute the electrical loads. This 
configuration was maintained until after the deorbit maneuver when the buses 
were untied for entry and landing. 
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem 
The environmental control and life support subsystem (ECLSS) performed nominally 
throughout the mission. 
The active thermal control subsystem (ATCS) performance was satisfactory 
throughout the mission. The FES primary A controller shut down during ascent at 
98:05:33:16 G.m.t. (00:00:04:16 MET) as the FES was entering its control band. 
The FES was successfully restarted using the primary A controller. This 
shutdown was similar to ascent shutdowns experienced on this vehicle during 
STS-41 and STS-48. The temperature oscillations which triggered the shutdown 
logic in the controller are attributed to a unique midpoint temperature sensor 
manifold which is a known condition. 
The radiator coldsoak provided cooling during entry through touchdown plus 
14 minutes when ammonia system A was activated using the secondary controller. 
Before system A was activated, Freon cooling loop 2 was switched to bypass flow 
to increase its flowrate and the temperature entering the ammonia boiler. These 
procedures were specifically developed for the ammonia boilers on OV-102 and 
.-. OV-103 to preclude under-temperature operation below 31°F. The procedures 
proved effective as the ammonia boiler controlled the temperature to 36.5OF. 
System A had provided 37 minutes of cooling when the ground cooling was 
initiated. 
The atmospheric revitalization subsystem performed nominally throughout the 
mission. During the redundant component check, the pressure control system was 
switched from system 1 to system 2. Both systems exhibited normal operation. 
The supply water and waste water subsystems performed adequately for the 
duration of the mission. All in-flight checkout requirements were performed and 
satisfied. 
Supply water was managed through the use of the overboard dump system and the 
flash evaporator system. One supply water dump was performed at an average dump 
rate of 1.63 percent/minute (2.74 lb/min). This dump was simultaneous with 
waste water dump 2. The supply water dump line temperature was maintained 
between 63 and 92OF throughout the mission with the operation of the line 
heater. 
Waste water was gathered at approximately the predicted rate. Three waste water 
dumps were performed at an average dump rate of 1.88 percent/min (3.11 lb/min). 
The waste water dump line temperature was maintained between 56 and 88OF 
throughout the mission, while the vacuum vent line temperature was between 59 
and 80°F. 
- A simultaneous supply and waste water dump was performed, beginning at 
approximately 101:19:42 G.m.t. (03:14:13 MET) and was viewed with the RMS wrist 
CCTV camera. A total of 35 lb of supply water was dumped; concurrently, 121 lb 
2 
of waste water was also dumped. RMS video, using the wrist camera, was recorded 
from initiation of the dump until approximately 75 minutes after the supply dump 
was terminated. The video was recorded as an aid in troubleshooting post-dump 
expulsions (burps) of water from the supply line which have been observed on 
three OV-103 and one OV-104 flights. Data indicate that two supply water 
"burps" occurred following the water dump within 1.5 hours of supply water dump 
valve closure. A review of the video verified water emission associated with 
the first occurrence, but the video was terminated prior to the second 
occurrence. This "burping" phenomenon was confirmed to occur on STS-53, STS-48, 
and STS-44, and is suspected to have occurred on previous flights of OV-103 and 
OV-104. A resolution to this condition continues to be developed. 
The water loop 2 interchanger bypass valve was slow in closing in the automatic 
(controller) mode when compared with other vehicles (>75 seconds from full 
bypass to full closed) (Flight Problem STS-56-V-08); however, its performance 
matches that observed on two previous flights of OV-103 (STS-53 and STS-42). 
The valve closed at a slower rate when in the controller mode, whereas, in the 
manual mode, the closing time for the valve did not exceed the SODB limits of 
60 + 15 seconds. As a result, the controller is suspected to be the cause of 
the-problem. 
The Freon coolant loop (FCL) 2 FPV was returned to the interchanger position to 
aid in cooling the cabin for entry. The water coolant loop 2 temperature 
controller was returned to the auto position to obtain data on the performance 
of the water bypass valve with one FPV in Payload and the other in Interchanger. 
The crew reported a glob of water about two ounces in size was on a portion of 
the water loop 2 inlet line to the cabin heat exchanger that was uninsulated. 
The water was most probably the result of condensation, as there were no 
indications of a leak. 
The waste collection system (WCS) performed normally throughout the mission. 
This flight was the first for the phase I fan separator design modifications, 
which were intended to minimize the possibility of flooding in flight. The crew 
reported that the WCS system operated properly. The WCS fan separator will 
receive a detailed inspection upon return to the vendor. 
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem 
The smoke detection subsystem showed no indications of smoke generation during 
the entire duration of the flight. Use of the fire suppression subsystem was 
not required. 
Airlock Support System 
Use of the airlock support components was not required because no extravehicular 
activity (EVA) was planned or required. The active system monitor parameters 
indicated normal outputs throughout the flight. 
The crew reported that the hardware for one of the DTO's was placed in the 
airlock for better cooling. 
Avionics and Software Subsystems 
The integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystem operated nominally. 
Six PTI maneuvers were performed during entry in support of DTO 251 - Entry 
Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test. The aileron trim excursion noted was like 
that seen on STS-50 and is believed to have been caused by asymmetric boundary 
layer transition. 
A digital autopilot (DAP)/universal pointing discrepancy occurred during SUSIM 
operations. After the desired pointing configuration with respect to the Sun's 
limb was established with the DAP in inertial hold, the universal pointing total 
error in roll started building at a rate of approximately 0.03 degree/minute 
(Flight Problem STS-56-1-02). This build-up was unexpected as the universal 
pointing required roll attitude and the inertial hold attitudes to both be held 
constant. The DAP errors were maintained within deadbands throughout the 
inertial hold period. 
The investigation of this DAP anomaly included audits of the software code, 
which showed no problems with the software. In addition, Software Production 
Facility (SPF) tests were performed in an attempt to recreate the anomaly, which 
could not be done. These audits and SPF tests showed that the software was not 
the cause of the anomaly. A workaround was developed for use during the 
subsequent SUSIM operations requiring universal pointing. 
The flight control system performed nominally throughout the mission. The 
- FCS checkout was completed satisfactorily at 104:06:55:33 G.m.t. 
(06:01:26:33 MET). During the switch checkout portions of the FCS checkout, 
indications were received that a power transient occurred within the ascent 
thrust vector control (ATVC) channel 4 electronics and caused it to fail (Flight 
Problem STS-56-V-09). The ATVC 4 power switch was cycled and power was restored 
to the unit. This anomaly did not affect the successful completion of the 
mission. 
Performance of the inertial measurement unit, star tracker, data processing 
system (DPS) hardware and software, and displays and controls was satisfactory. 
Communications and Tracking Subsystem 
The network signal processor (NSP) 2 uplink command capability was intermittent 
in the low-frequency mode (Flight Problem STS-55-V-03). Troubleshooting of the 
ground equipment was performed and no problems were found. The command 
capability was switched to NSP 1 and the intermittent command problem cleared; 
however, communications continued to be degraded. Operations were continued on 
NSP 1 until about 27 hours MET when NSP 2 was reselected. Both occurrences of 
degraded communications took place after several hours of nominal use of the 
respective NSP1s on low frequency (Flight Problem STS-56-V-03). A switch to 
high frequency alleviated the problem. Later in the mission, the S-band system 
operated in the low-frequency mode for over 54 hours without any observed 
abnormal communications problems. This signature is similar to an STS-52 
low-frequency in-flight anomaly in which the cable between the preamplifier and 
the switch assembly for the low-frequency path had a fault. 
At 098:14:30 G.m.t. (00:09:01 MET), the TIPS associated with DTO 660 was not 
producing an output when the ground was transmitting via the graphics mode 
(Ku-band). The TIPS was producing garbled output when the ground was 
transmitting text (S-band); some characters were not being received clearly and 
were being replaced with question marks which is the normal procedure for the 
TIPS. However, after troubleshooting, the TIPS began working with the Ku-band 
system. 
The TAGS was powered down to conserve power. A few hours after one successful 
test message was received onboard, the crew reported that none of the subsequent 
uplink messages were in the TIPS output tray. The crew took the TIPS down and 
set it up again, and the TIPS passed the self-test, but again no messages were 
received onboard. The test messages were received in the ground laboratory, 
which indicates that the ground system was operating properly. The TAGS was 
repowered for receiving uplink messages. At 100:11:00 G.m.t. (02:05:31 MET), 
the crew began reconfiguring the TIPS in preparation for additional testing. An 
in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure to troubleshoot problems with the TIPS was 
performed. TIPS must receive a clock signal from the KUSP to operate properly. 
The light indicator showing whether the clock signal is being received by TIPS 
from the Ku-band signal processor (KUSP) was initially off and then illuminated 
later. A subsequent TIPS test via Ku-band was successful; however, the TIPS 
again failed to receive messages following the one successful transmission. 
The TIPS operation through S-band audio performed well after the addition of a 
10-dB attenuator in the delta modulation voice system ground equipment. A 
troubleshooting plan for TIPS Ku-band data transmissions was developed and sent 
to the crew to be performed as time permitted. 
- 
After troubleshooting, five transmissions of graphics through the Ku-band to the 
TIPS were attempted with the first three being received and the last two not 
being received. Preliminary analysis indicated that the TIPS cable may have 
been faulty; however a continuity test showed that the cable was satisfactory 
for use. In addition, the cable was attached to the TAGS, and the TAGS operated 
properly with this cable. The TIPS cable was reconnected to the TIPS and 
operations through the Ku-band were satisfactory. Operation of the TIPS in the 
text mode through the S-band continued to be very satisfactory. 
Early during flight day 6, the crew reported that the TIPS was operating 
properly both on the S-band and the Ku-band. However, a few hours later, a TIPS 
uplink message was attempted via the Ku-band, and a second message was attempted 
about an hour later. Neither message was received onboard, and it was 
recommended that the TIPS be turned off. After 45 minutes, the TIPS was again 
powered up and an S-band message was successfully uplinked. The TIPS was again 
powered off for approximately 15 minutes, powered back up, and a Ku-band message 
was sent but was not received onboard. 
On flight day 7, a decision was made that no more TIPS/Ku-band mode 
troubleshooting would be performed during the mission. Another test was 
performed with a message uplinked via the portable audio data modem (PADM). The 
crew was then able to view the file on the payload general support computer 
(PGSC) and print the file on the TIPS printer. The initial printout was twice 
the normal size so the crew scaled subsequent printouts to 50 percent for better 
readability. 
-- 
.- 
The Ku-band mode 1 [phase modulation (PM)] channel 3 return link data quality 
was degraded (Flight Problem STS-56-V-04). Preliminary troubleshooting 
indicated that mode 1 operated on low-data-rate high-rate multiplexer (HRM) 
data, but did not operate on high-rate HRM data. The operational data are 
satisfactory regardless of the data rate being transmitted. Also, the frequency 
modulation (FM) mode was functioning properly. Much of the equipment in the 
signal processor is common between the PM and FM modes. As a result of this 
problem, new custom test formats 27, 28, 29, and 30 were developed; however, no 
improvement in Ku-band operations were achieved with these formats. Ku-band 
downlink was tested in format 11 (32 Mbps) on channel 3 in the payload maximum 
mode data rate while equipment was powered down to perform an electromagnetic 
interference test. Channel 3 data were again degraded, and the channel 2 link 
was good. 
A Ku-band payload maximum baseline test was performed from 106:03:00 to 
106:04:10 G.m.t. (07:21:31 to 07:22:41 MET). After the Spacelab was 
reactivated, further troubleshooting was performed in an attempt to narrow the 
data transmission problem to a specific payload. Results of these tests 
indicated that the Ku-band was operating satisfactorily. 
The Ku-band system passed a self-test at 101:05:32 G.m.t. (03:00:03 MET). 
Ku-band radar tracked SPARTAN from 270 feet at 101:06:22 G.m.t. until the system 
was reconfigured to the communication mode at 101:07:05 G.m.t., when SPARTAN was 
at 3000 feet. There were no dropouts and the radar was still locked when the 
system was switched to the communication mode. 
- 
Following receipt of the last page of an uplink message at 104:17:17 G.m.t. 
(06:11:48 MET), the crew reported that the TAGS showed a developing (DVLP) 
indication without a page advance command from the ground. One page advance was 
performed and TAGS continued to show DVLP indication until a power cycle was 
performed. The TAGS showed a jam after the power cycle and the DVLP indication 
changed back to the normal ready status. 
The TAGS troubleshooting was performed by the crew. The paper transport door 
was opened and accordioned paper was found and partially removed at the cutter 
bar. Since the TAGS power was still on (not in accordance with the malfunction 
procedure), the lower booster rollers fed the remaining paper into the 
developer. The paper was threaded into the lower paper path, causing a jam in 
the developer (Flight Problem STS-56-V-11). As a result, the TAGS was shut down 
and printed matter was uplinked via the TIPS text mode (S-band) for the 
remainder of the mission. Graphics capability existed by uplinking via the PADM 
to the PGSC and then printing on the TIPS. 
At 104:07:56 G.m.t. (06:02:27 MET), the Commander reported that his headset 
interface unit (HIU) had failed (Flight Problem STS-55-V-10). The Commander 
used a spare HIU for the remainder of the mission. 
At 104:12:18 G.m.t. (06:06:49 MET), a CCTV camera was indicating an 
over-temperature condition. At 105:06:41 G.m.t. (07:01:12 MET), the keel camera 
(PL2) was shut off and the over-temperature message went away. 
The operational instrumentation (01) performance was satisfactory. 
- 
At 107:09:03 G.m.t. (08:03:34 MET), the modular auxiliary data system (MADS) 
did not begin recording when commanded (Flight Problem STS-56-V-14). About 
six minutes after the command was sent, the MADS recorder began recording, and 
the recorder operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. 
Structures and Mechanical Subsvstems 
All structures and mechanical subsystems performed nominally and the main 
landing gear tires were considered to be in good condition following a KSC 
landing. 
STS-56 was the seventh flight of the drag chute system. The drag chute was 
deployed as planned prior to nose wheel touchdown and all operations were 
nominal. The drag chute was jettisoned as planned 29 seconds after deployment. 
The following table shows where the components of the drag chute system were 
found. 
The drag chute configuration for this flight was 90-percent reefed, which data 
have shown to be more stable than the baseline parachute. Operation of this 
parachute validated the Ames Research Center wind tunnel results relative to 
parachute stability. 
Event/component 
Mortar cover 
Sabot 
Door 
Pilot chute 
NLG touchdown 
Main chute 
Wheel stop 
The landing and braking data are presented in the table on the following page. 
Location from runway 
threshold and 
centerline of 
runway, f t 
4960 & 147 East 
4980 & 23 West 
5065 & 7 West 
5030 & 0 
5587 & 0 
9005 & 70 East 
10603 & 0 
Aerodynamics, Heating and Thermal Interfaces 
The ascent aerodynamics were nominal except for the wind shear that was 
encountered at lift-off plus 65 seconds at Mach 1.55. This wind shear resulted 
in alpha and beta excursions. A sudden increase in aerodynamic loads on the 
wing was identified as a possible forcing function that induced an oscillation 
in the elevon actuator primary pressure reading. 
The entry aerodynamics were nominal with the control surfaces responding as 
expected except that there was an apparent recurrence of the aileron trim 
phenomena that occurred on STS-50. The entry aerodynamics were affected by the 
six PTIts performed in support of DTO 251, in addition to the two body flap 
maneuvers that were performed. 
LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS 
Vehicle heating data showed structural temperatures higher on the right side of 
the vehicle and that is consistent with asymmetric boundary layer transition. 
The performance of DTO 251 did not affect the control of the vehicle. 
Thermal Control Subsystem 
Parameter 
Main gear touchdown 
Nose gear touchdown 
The thermal control subsystem (TCS) performed satisfactorily throughout the 
mission with no out-of-limits temperatures noted. 
Speed, 
keas 
205.6 
143.8 
From 
threshold, 
f t 
1182 
5587 
Braking initiation speed 130.9 knots (keas) 
Brake-on time 33.6 seconds (not sustained) 
Rollout distance 9,519 feet 
Rollout time 63.2 seconds 
Runway 33 (concrete) at KSC 
Orbiter weight at landing 207,851 lb (landing estimate) 
Sink rate, ft/sec 
'3.0 
n/a 
Pitch rate, 
deg/sec 
n/a 
2.92 
Brake sensor location 
Left-hand inboard 1 
Left-hand inboard 3 
Left-hand outboard 2 
Left-hand outboard 4 
Right-hand inboard 1 
Right-hand inboard 3 
Right-hand outboard 2 
Right-hand outboard 4 
Peak 
pressure, 
psia 
1248 
1272 
1284 
1092 
1116 
1044 
948 
936 
Brake assembly 
Left-hand outboard 
Left-hand inboard 
Right-hand inboard 
Right-hand outboard 
Energy, 
million f t-lb 
16.21 
17.90 
12.77 
10.96 
Temperature, O F  
36.7 
36.7 
7.3 
7.3 
41.9 
41.9 
Tire location 
Left-hand outboard 
Left-hand inboard 
Right-hand inboard 
Right-hand outboard 
Left-hand nose gear 
Right-hand nose gear 
No. 1 pressure, 
psia 
351.4 
350.9 
325.1 
327.9 
334.1 
332.1 
No. 2 pressure, 
psia 
351.4 
350.2 
324.3 
327.9 
334.9 
332.1 
A loose thermal blanket on the aft bulkhead (Xo 1307) was observed at 
101:17:05 G.m.t. (03:11:36 MET) during video downlink of the payload bay (Flight 
Problem STS-56-V-05). Thermal data were assessed to determine the effects of the 
unsnapped thermal blanket on Orbiter subsystems. The preliminary assessment 
indicated that this condition would not pose an over-temperature concern to the 
OMS fuel high point bleed line on the aft bulkhead during the remaining planned 
top-Sun attitudes, since thermal blankets cover this line. 
L5D aft vernier thruster oxidizer feedline temperature (V42T2560A) was 
consistently high and peaked at 196OF, which is higher than normal but below SODB 
limits. The Reaction Control Subsystem section of this report discusses this 
anomaly in greater detail. 
Aerothermodvnamics 
The aerothermodynamics were nominal with acreage heating within limits and local 
heating normal. The structural temperature rise was near the limit of experience 
with the right wing temperature rise greater than the left wing. In addition, 
the TPS damage was near the limit of experience with several hits greater than 
0.3-inch depth on the lower right forward fuselage. 
Thermal Protection Subsystem 
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performance was satisfactory. Based on 
structural temperature response data, the entry heating was higher than average. 
In particular, temperature rises on the lower aft centerline and the lower right .- 
wing were the largest ever measured on OV-103 (approximately 25OF higher than 
average). The overall boundary layer transition from laminar flow to turbulent 
flow was earlier than normal. The transition occurred at 1000 seconds after 
entry interface on the forward side of the vehicle (X/L=0.3), and at 980 seconds 
after entry interface on the aft right portion of the vehicle (X/L=0.6). Also, 
transition was asymmetrical from right to left on the vehicle. Transition 
occurred 140 seconds later on the left side of the vehicle than on the right 
side. 
A total of 156 hits were experienced during the mission. Of these 156, 36 had a 
major dimension greater than one inch. The total number of hits was near the 
average of all missions, whereas the number of hits 1 inch or larger was greater 
than average when compared with previous missions. 
The distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a single source of 
ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice and TPS debris from random 
sources. The table on the following page shows the the number of hits in each 
area of the vehicle. 
The largest tile damage site measured 9.0 by 2.0 by 0.2 inches (included two 
tiles) and was located on the lower surface of the right-hand wing leading edge 
extension (glove area). The shallow depth of 0.2 inch is indicative of an impact 
. 
by low-density material, such as ET insulation. Also, one unusually large impact 
measuring 4.0 inches long by 2.5 inches wide by 1.3 inches deep was found on th 
lower right wing aft of the main landing gear door. 
_--. 
Reusable carbon carbon (RCC) nose cap performance was nominal. The gap filler 
between the nose cap and the adjacent tiles was severely breached for 
approximately 10 inches on the lower surface. (This nose cap gap filler was 
replaced and this required removal of the forward RCS module and extension of 
the nose cap.) The primary nose landing gear door (NLGD) thermal barrier was in 
good condition, and no NLGD tiles were damaged. The main landing gear door 
(MLGD) thermal barriers were in excellent condition except for two minor 
tears/frays. The ET door thermal barriers were also in good condition. 
However, it was noted that the barriers appeared to have experienced higher than 
normal heating. The left-hand RCC panels 6 and 9 showed bubbling and blistering 
(seen on previous flights). A gap filler o the body flap was damaged with its 
- outer fabric fused to the adjacent tile's surface, which is indicative of high 
heating . 
Vehicle surface 
Lower surface 
Upper surface 
Right side 
Left side 
Right OMS pod 
Left OMS pod 
Total 
All three dome-mounted heat shield blankets sustained minor damage. Base heat 
shield peppering was less than average. Two tiles on the right side trailing 
edge of the vertical stinger were damaged, apparently from drag chute 
deployment. 
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes. 
Hits > 1 inch 
18 
2 
0 
0 
1 
15 
36 
Elevon cove inspections revealed six tile slumps, four on the right-hand side 
and two on the left-hand side. The most severe slumping occurred on tiles 
adjacent to the outboard center hinge point, where strain isolation pad (SIP) 
charring and discoloration of carrier panel koropan was also found. This is the 
first tile slumping found in this area of the vehicle since the elevon cove TPS 
was redesigned prior to STS-26. The increased local heating and SIP charring is 
believed to be attributed to the extreme up-elevon schedule flown as a part of 
DTO 0251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test- Alternate Elevon Schedule; 
however, a connection between this DTO and the early/asymmetric transition is 
difficult to prove. This DTO has been performed on three previous flights, none 
of which indicated increased heating. However, on one of those flights 
(STS-50), asymmetric transition was suspected due to a aileron trim anomaly. 
Surface thermocouple data to support this conclusion are not available on 
ov-102. 
Total hits 
9 4 
2 3 
0 
0 
4 
3 5 
156 
-- 
All three ET/Orbiter separation devices (EO-1, -2, and -3) appeared to have 
functioned properly. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance retention 
shutters were closed properly. No flight hardware was found on the runway below 
the umbilical doors. 
- 
Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited moderate hazing. Only a very light haze was 
visible on the other windows. Some streaks were visible on windows 3 and 4. 
Surface wipes were taken from each window for laboratory analysis. 
A portable Shuttle thermal imager (STI) was used to measure the TPS surface 
temperatures of three areas on the Orbiter in accordance with Space Shuttle 
documentation. Ten minutes after landing, the Orbiter nosecap reusable carbon 
carbon (RCC) was 20Z°F. Twenty minutes after landing, the right-hand wing 
leading edge RCC panel 9 was 10Z°F and panel 17 was 97OF. 
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT 
All flight crew equipment/government furnished equipment operated satisfactorily 
and supported the mission as required. 
REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM 
The RMS operated in an excellent manner throughout the mission with no anomalies 
or problems identified. STS-56 was the tenth flight of the serial number 201 
arm, and the first flight of the serial number 403 end effector. 
The prime RMS activity was the deployment and retrieval of the SPARTAN-201 
payload. For most of the mission, the RMS was positioned in a port-side, 
forward parked configuration that placed it out of the field of view of the 
ATLAS-2 experiments. 
Approximately 6 1/2 hours into the mission, a successful RMS checkout was 
performed per standard procedures. Because of time constraints to begin ATLAS-2 
operations, two steps of the checkout were deferred until later in the mission: 
the manual augmented mode test and the operator-commanded auto-sequence test. 
On flight day 4 (03:00:42 MET), the RMS deployed the SPARTAN-201. The payload 
was not equipped with telemetry, but the execution of the planned "pirouette" 
maneuver after release indicated that the preprogrammed onboard control system 
was operating properly. On flight day 6 (05:01:50 MET), the SPARTAN-201 was 
retrieved by the RMS and returned to the payload bay for return to Earth. 
Since there is no ground-based training facility that fully models the berthing 
of a release-engage mechanism (REM), some concern existed premission that the 
difficulty of the task was not fully evaluated. The difficulty involved the 
precise positioning and alignment needed to receive three ready-to-latch 
indications. The berthing of the SPARTAN-201 into the REM was accomplished in 
8 minutes in an excellent manner. The maneuver was facilitated by the use of a 
berthing camera located on the keel of the payload bay, plus a video camera 
located on the SPARTAN mission peculiar experiment support structure (MPESS). 
The RMS wrist camera was used during the mission to monitor a supply and waste 
water dump on flight day 5. The data from this camera provided the engineering 
community the first positive indications of the water-expulsion phenomenon that .- 
occurs after a supply water dump. 
- 
The RMS was cradled at 105:11:49 G.m.t. (07:06:20 MET) after successfully 
meeting all requirements placed on the system during the flight. Because of the 
mission extension and the need to conserve power, the RMS heaters were turned 
off during much of the final flight day. No negative effects were observed and 
temperatures did not go much lower than those observed during the periods of 
heater activation, 
INTEGRATION 
Hardware provided for integration of the cargo into the vehicle performed 
nominally throughout the flight. No new mission-unique integration hardware was 
manifested for this flight. 
Two Integration in-flight anomalies were identified from the data. These 
anomalies are discussed in the appropriate section of this report. 
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
Thirteen Development Test Objectives (DTOts) were assigned to the STS-56 
mission. Of these, 11 were performed, and the results are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
- 
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES 
DTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test - All six of the planned 
PTI's were performed in support of this DTO. The maneuvers did not impact the 
entry operations. High aileron trim (1.8 degrees) was experienced and it was 
similar to that seen on STS-50 during performance of this DTO. Data have been 
given to the sponsor and the results will be published in a separate report. 
DTO 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were recorded on 
onboard recorders for this data-only DTO. The data have been given to the 
sponsor for evaluation, and the analyses and results will be published in 
separate documentation. 
DTO 305D - Ascent Compartment Venting Evaluation - Data were recorded on onboard 
recorders for this data-only DTO. The data have been given to the sponsor for 
evaluation, and the analyses and results will be published in separate 
documentation. 
DTO 306D - Descent Compartment Venting Evaluation - Data were recorded on 
onboard recorders for this data-only DTO. The data have been given to the 
sponsor for evaluation, and the analyses and results will be published in 
separate documentation. 
DTO 308D - Vibration and Acoustic Evaluation - Data were recorded on onboard 
recorders for this data-only DTO. The data have been given to the sponsor for 
evaluation, and the analyses and results will be published in separate 
documentation. 
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance (Method 3) - This DTO was successfully accomplished 
with the acquisition of many excellent views of the ET. The two film rolls 
contained 74 pictures that were taken with the Nikon F4 camera and a 300-mm 
lens. Detailed findings from this DTO will be reported in the JSC STS-56 
Photographic/Television Analysis Final Report. 
Excellent sunlit views were acquired of most of the ET surface except the side 
toward the Orbiter (+Z axis). The pictures were acquired several minutes later 
than usual because the night launch increased the time before the tank entered 
daylight. 
Apparent damage to the ET TPS on the intertank acreage was observed in the 
pictures. The unusual markings or divots seen on the photography has resulted 
in the declaration of an in-flight anomaly (Flight Problem STS-56-T-01). The 
following items were noted during the screening: 
a. Six or more light-colored marks or divots were visible on the intertank 
TPS on the -Z axis or far side of the ET. Marks or divots are also visible on 
the liquid hydrogedintertank flange closeout. A light-colored mark is visible 
on the ET TPS near the right SRB/ET aft attachment as seen on the -Z axis views. 
An unusual looking dark area or shadow is associated with this mark. 
Approximately five marks or divots are visible on the liquid hydrogedintertank 
closeout flange on the -Y axis of the ET. Detailed analysis of the photography 
revealed 11 divots that were between 18 and 26 inches in size. 
b. Bright marks are visible on the aft ET/Orbiter attachment bracing. 
These bright marks may be reflections of sunlight of normal protuberances on the 
attachment bracing. 
c. The TPS on the ET nose and aft dome appeared normal. The booster 
separation motor (BSM) burn scars on the liquid oxygen tank appeared typical of 
previous missions. 
The crew noted one problem in that the manifesting of this DTO was very late in 
the flow, requiring changes to the cameras as late as the day before launch, 
which impacted the crew and their preparations for the flight. 
DTO 319D - Orbiter/Payload Acceleration and Acoustic Environment Data - Data 
were recorded for this data-only DTO. The data have been given to the sponsor, 
and the analyses and results will be published in separate documentation. 
DTO 520 - Edwards Lakebed Runway Bearing Strength and Rolling Friction 
Assessment for Orbiter Landings - This DTO was not accomplished as the vehicle 
landed at KSC. 
DTO 521 - Orbiter Drag Chute System - This DTO was accomplished during the 
landing and rollout phase as planned. 
DTO 653 - Evaluation of the MK I Rowing Machine - This DTO was accomplished and 
all operations were nominal. Results of this DTO will be published in separate 
documentation. 
- 
DTO 656 - PGSC Single Event Upset Monitoring - This DTO was accomplished and the 
results are being evaluated by the sponsor. The results of the analyses will be 
published in separate documentation. 
DTO 700-2 - Laser Range and Range Rate Device - The Laser Range and Range Rate 
Device DTO was performed during the SPARTAN deployment. The long-range laser 
for this DTO provided range data during the SPARTAN deployment that varied 
differently from the Ku-band radar data. The LTI component was used for 
short-range tracking and performed well. The MELIOS was used for longer range 
(minimum range is specified as 50 mI150 ft). The MELIOS range measurement 
deviated from the Ku-band measurement as the Orbiter moved away from the 
SPARTAN. 
During rendezvous with the SPARTAN, the LTI device was used for tracking at 
ranges from 1193 ft with good results. The MELIOS device was also used during 
rendezvous with satisfactory results. The crew replaced the MELIOS battery 
after the SPARTAN deployment operations. Low battery voltage was a possible 
cause of the inaccurate readings during the SPARTAN deployment; however, the 
crew stated that the callouts were given a low priority because of the heavy 
workload, and this may have contributed to the inaccuracies. 
DTO 700-6 - The global positioning system (GPS) data were not being displayed on 
the portable computer in support of DTO 700-6. An IFM troubleshooting procedure 
was performed; and the system began working properly. After about two hours, 
the system again stopped working. 
- 
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO was not performed as 
crosswinds were not of sufficient magnitude to meet the minimum requirements of 
this DTO. 
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
A total of 15 DSO's were assigned to the STS-56 mission. The following 
paragraphs list the number and title of each DSO, as well as any preliminary 
results that were available at the time of publication. 
DSO 321 - Frequency Interference Measurement - Approximately 4 hours of data 
were recorded on flight day 2. After operating for 11 hours on flight day 7, 
the unit experienced a power failure and was stowed after unsuccessfully 
attempting to restore power. Results of this DSO will be published in separate 
documentation. 
DSO 322 - Human Lymphocyte Locomotion in Microgravity - The bioreactor for this 
DSO initially encountered problems in initiating operations because of excessive 
temperatures. The bioreactor was moved to the airlock for cooling using the 
"elephant trunk", and operations became nominal. The time of operations was 
extended because of the delay in activation. Upon completion, the bioreactor 
was stowed in its original locker for entry, and satisfactory temperatures were 
maintained. 
DSO 469 - In-Flight Radiation Dose-Distribution [Tissue Equivalent Proportional 
Counter (TEPC) only] - This DSO equipment operated nominally throughout the 
mission. The unit was stowed for entry at 106:00:34 G.m.t. (07:19:05 MET) 
DSO 476 - In-Flight Aerobic Exercise - All planned exercises were completed and 
the ergometer was reported to be very quiet. 
DSO 485 - Inter Mars TEPC (no data during ascent or descent) - This DSO was 
accomplished and the data have been given to the sponsor for analysis. The 
results of the analyses will be reported in separate documentation. 
DSO 488 - Measurement of Formaldehyde Using Passive Dosimetry - All operations 
associated with this DSO were nominal. The analyses and results will be 
reported in separate documentation. 
DSO 603B - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing, and Egress - This DSO was 
accomplished and the data have been given to the sponsor for analysis. The 
analyses and results will be reported in separate documentation. 
DSO 605 - Postural Equilibrium Control During Landing/Egress - This DSO was 
accomplished and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor. The results of 
the analyses will be reported in separate documentation. 
DSO 617 - Evaluation of Functional Skeletal Muscle Performance Following Space 
Flight - This DSO was completed and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor. 
The results of the analyses will be reported in separate documentation. 
DSO 624 - Pre and Postflight Measurement of Cardiorespiratory Responses to 
Submaximal Exercises - This DSO was accomplished and the data are being 
evaluated by the sponsor. The results of the analyses will be reported in 
separate documentation. 
DSO 626 - Cardiovascular and Cerebrovascular Response to Standing Before and 
After Space Flight - This DSO was accomplished and the data are being analyzed 
by the sponsor. The results of the analyses will be reported in separate 
documentation. 
DSO 802 - Educational Activities (Objective 1) - This DSO was accomplished. 
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - This DSO was accomplished during the course 
of performing regular video documentation. The results are being evaluated. 
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - This DSO was accomplished. 
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - This DSO was accomplished. 
PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSES 
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VIDEO ANALYSIS 
On launch day, 24 of the 24 expected videos were received and screened. In 
addition, during the course of the mission 51 of the 54 expected launch films 
were reviewed. No potential in-flight anomalies were observed in any of the 
launch films or video. 
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VIDEO ANALYSIS 
The results of the analysis of the photography taken in support of DTO 312 are 
contained in the Detailed Test Objectives section of this report. 
A white debris object was seen on video during the SPARTAN-201 capture. 
Measurements of the size and velocity of this object were made. The diameter of 
the RMS end effector was used for scale to determine the size of the object. 
The diameter of the RMS end effector is 13.6 inches without the thermal blanket 
material. The object was seen to pass in front of the RMS arm. As a result, a 
maximum-size estimate of the object was made assuming the debris to be at the 
same distance as the arm. The dimension of the object was determined to be 
2 by 3 inches. The velocity of the debris was 1.15 ft/sec with respect to the 
Orbiter. 
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VIDEO ANALYSIS 
On landing day, 17 videos plus the NASA Select video were received and screened. 
The screening of two of the videos showed several pieces of debris appear to 
fall from the nose wheel well at nose landing gear door opening. The debris 
traveled along the underside of the Orbiter and toward the left wing. 
Video coverage of the drag chute deployment was also obtained. The deployment 
appeared to be as expected; however, the Orbiter deviated slightly from the 
.-. runway centerline in a westward direction at the time the drag chute disreefed. 
TABLE I.- STS-56 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
- 
a MSFC supplied data. 
Event 
APU activation 
SRB HPU activationa 
Main propulsion 
System starta 
SRB ignition command 
(lift-off) 
Throttle up to 
100 percent thrusta 
Throttle down to 
89 percent thrusta 
Throttle down to 
69 percent thrusta 
Maximum dynamic 
pressure (q) 
Throttle up to 
104 percent thrusta 
Both SRM's chamber 
pressure at 50 psia 
End SRM actiona 
SRB separation command 
SRB physicala 
separation 
Throttle down fora 
3g acceleration 
3g acceleration 
Throttle down to 
67 percent thrusta 
Engine Shutdowna 
Description 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
LH HPU system A start command 
LH HPU system B start command 
RH HPU system A start command 
RH HPU system B start command 
Engine 3 start command accepted 
Engine 2 start command accepted 
Engine 1 start command accepted 
SRB ignition command to SRB 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Derived ascent dynamic 
pressure 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
RH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
LH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
LH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
RH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
SRB separation command flag 
LH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 
RH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Total load factor 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accept 
Engine 2 command accept 
Engine 1 command accept 
Actual time, 
G.m. t. 
098:05:24:11.84 
098:05:24:12.77 
098:05:24:13.60 
098:05:28:32.166 
098:05:28:32.326 
098:05:28:32.486 
098:05:28:32.646 
098:05:28:53.410 
098:05:28:53.530 
098:05:28:53.648 
098:05:28:59.986 
098:05:29:04:048 
098:05:29:04:050 
098:05:29:04:050 
098:05:29:21:170 
098:05:29:21:170 
098:05:29:21:209 
098:05:29:28.370 
098:05:29:28.371 
098:05:29:28.409 
098:05:29:53 
098:05:30:01.009 
098:05:30:01.971 
098:05:30:01.971 
098:05:31:00.666 
098:05:31:00.906 
098:05:31:03.256 
098:05:31:03.286 
098:05:31:07 
098:05:31:05.866 
098:05:31:05.866 
098:05:36:30.617 
098:05:36:30.621 
098:05:36:30.652 
098:05:36:30.5 
098:05:37:28.218 
098:05:37:28.222 
098:05:37:28.252 
098:05:37:34.298 
098:05:37:34.302 
098:05:37:34.332 
TABLE I.- STS-56 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued) 
Actual time, 
G.m. t. 
098:05:37:34 
098:05:37:35 
098:05:37:53 
Not performed - 
direct insertion 
trajectory flown 
098:05:45:52.07 
098:05:45:53.44 
098:05:45:54.40 
098:06:06:07.8 
098:06:06:07.7 
098:06:08:37.4 
098:06:08:37.2 
098:07:02:54 
098:07:04:13 
101:06:11:33 
102:09:39:37.0 
Not applicable 
102:09:39:45.4 
Not applicable 
103:07:20:05 
104:06:55:33.27 
104:06:59:53.15 
107:05:33 
107:07:57:16 
107:07:59:54 
107:10:29:27.82 
107:10:53:08.45 
107:10:53:09.65 
107:10:34:25.3 
107:10:34:25.4 
Event 
MECO 
ET separation 
OMS-1 ignition 
OMS-1 cutoff 
APU deactivation 
OMS-2 ignition 
OMS-2 cutoff 
Payload bay door open 
SPARTAN-201 Deploy 
OMS-3 ignition 
OMS-3 cutoff 
SPARTAN-201 Grapple 
Flight control 
system checkout 
APU start 
APU stop 
ATLAS-2 Powerdown 
Payload bay door 
close 
APU activation 
for entry 
Deorbit maneuver 
ignition 
Description 
Command flag 
Confirm flag 
ET separation command flag 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU 2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
PLBD right open 1 
PLBD left open 1 
Voice call 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Voice call 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
Voice Call 
PLBD right close 1 
PLBD left close 1 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
TABLE 1.- STS-56 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Concluded) 
-- - -  - 
Event 
Deorbit maneuver 
cutoff 
Entry interface 
(400K) 
Blackout ends 
Terminal area 
energy management 
Main landing gear 
contact 
Main landing gear 
weight on wheels 
Drag chute deploy 
Nose landing gear 
contact 
Nose landing gear 
weight on wheels 
Drag chute jettison 
Wheels stop 
APU deactivation 
Description 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Current orbital altitude 
above reference ellipsoid 
Data locked at high sample 
rate 
Major mode change (305) 
LH MLG tire pressure 
RH MLG tire pressure 
LH MLG weight on wheels 
RH MLG weight on wheels 
Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts 
NLG tire pressure 
NLG WT on Wheels -1 
Drag chute jettison 1 CP Volts 
Velocity with respect to 
runway 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
Actual time, 
G.m.t. 
107:10:37:53.7 
107:10:37:53.8 
107:11:05:53 
No blackout 
107:11:31:01 
107:11:37:19 
107:11:37:19 
107:11:37:24 
107:11:37:23 
107:11:37:30.8 
107:11:37:34 
107:11:37:34 
107:11:38:00.0 
107:11:38:22 
107:11:53:09.35 
107:11:53:10.08 
107:11:53:11.53 
TABLE 11.- STS-56 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
I I I 
Number I Title I Reference I Comments 
MPS LH High Point Bleed 
Valve ?w-22) Failed To 
Indicate Closed 
096:06:31 G.m.t. 
IM 56RF01 
IPR 51V-0002 
STS-56-V-03 Low Frequency Uplink I Command Difficulty 
Fuel Cell 1 0  Reactant 
Valve False dose 
Indication 
098:06:46 G.m.t. 
CAR 48RP03 
UA-3-A0023 
STS-56-V-04 High Data Rate Downlink 
Proble~ns 
STS-56-V-05 
TRANSFERRED TO WA 
Aft Bulkhead T h e m 1  
Blanket Loose 
STS-56-V-06 
SrS-56-V-07 Deleted. I 
Universal Pointing Total 
DAP Error Buildup 
098:14:57 G.m.t. 
IM 56RP04 
IPR 51V-0005 
MPS LH2 high point bleed valve (W-22) failed to indicate closed, and 
caused a launch countdown termination at T-11 seconds. Subsequent 
testing showed the valve cycled with no response from the closed 
indication. Curing the second launch attempt, closed indication 
returned at T-3.5 seconds and then operated normally when the valve 
was cycled for vacuum inerting. 
KSC: Troubleshoot aft wiring: replace if required. 
The fuel cell 1 oxygen reactant valve indicated closed at 
098:06:46:54 G.m.t. Buses A and B were tied together initially. Late1 
buses A and C were tied together. The fuel cell continued to operate 
properly confirming an instrumentation-only failure. This anomaly is i 
Repeat of Flight Problem STS-48-V-03 (OV-103). The proper indication 
occurred after the valve cycled postlanding for fuel cell shutdown 
shutdown/inerting. 
KSC: Troubleshoot wiring and replace oxygen manifold 1 panel after 
deservicing. 
Degraded communications were observed on NSP 2 and on NSP 1. Both 
occurrences were after several hours of nominal use of the respective 
NSPfs. Low frequency is a common denominator, switching to high 
frequency cleared up problem. Switched back to low frequency on flight 
Iday I .  
KSC: Measure coaxial cable temperatures and verify connector 
torques. 
Payload bay thermal blanket on the aft bulkhead was partially detached. 
KSC: Evaluate postlanding. 
098:12:30 G.m.t. 
IPR 5lV-0003 
Downlink data quality degraded on both Ku-band channels 2 and 3 when 
when 32 Mbps or 48 Mbps data were put on the Ku-band channel 3 in 
Payload M x  (PL MAX) mode (PM mode). When 2 %ps data were put on 
channel 3 in PL MAX mode, data quality was intermittent. Bldg 45 chit 
approved to delay removal of ATLAS payload. 
099:13:30 G.m.t. Curing execution of the SUSIPl Alignment Procedure Part B, there was an 
unexpected change in roll attitude while the DAP was in the Inertial 
mode. While holding this attitude, roll total errors indicated a 
change in roll attitude of approximately -0.03 deg/min; however, DAP 
errors remained within the 0.033 deg/min deadband. The problem was 
repeated and a workaround of using DAP auto mode was proven successful. 
KSC: No action required. 
TABLE 11.- STS-56 PROBLEM m C K I N G  LIST 
Number 
STS-56-V-08 
STS-56-V-09 
STS-56-V-10 
STS-56-4-11 
STS-56-V-12 
STS-56-V-13 
STS-56-V-14 
Reference 
099:03:54 G.m.t. 
104:07:07 G.m.t. 
IM 56W06 
IPR 51V-0004 
104:07:56 G.n.t. 
IM 56RF03 
104:17:17 G.m.t. 
IN 56RF05 
PR-PCP-3-17-0298 
IM 56RF07 
IPR 51V-0011 
107:09:03 G.m.t. 
Title 
Water m a s s  Valve 
Controller Slow 
LEVEL I11 CLOSURE 
ATVC 4 Power Loss 
Indication 
Commander's HIU Pailed 
LE?JEL I11 CLOSURE 
T X S  Jam 
Fuel Cell 1 Substack 3 
A Voltage Increases During 
Purge 
RCS Thmster LSD Heater 
Failed On 
PIADS Didn't Record m e n  
Colrmanded Prior to Entry 
m L  111 -SURE 
Comments 
The water loop 2 interchanger bypass valve was slow closing when in the 
controller mode. The valve is closing with the specification 
requirewnts when closed manually. This performance matches the data 
of STS-53 and STS-42. 
KSC: No KSC action required. 
Curing FCS checkout mode/channel switch checkout, ATVC 4 showed 
anomalous power signature on all SSHE actuators. The signature is 
indicative of an internal power supply anomaly in ATVC 4. 
W C :  Trouble shooting did not reproduce problem; ATVC 4 was 
replaced with Ffl 29. 
Commander reported that his Headset Interface Unit (HIU) had failed. 
Switched to a spare unit. 
At 104:17:17 G.m.t., the crew reported that the TAGS paper had jammed 
around the cutter bar. The crew performed the required malfunction 
procedure (2.8). The crew opened the paper transport door and removed 
paper which had accordioned at the cutter bar. The crew then threaded 
paper into the lower path with the power on, and the lower booster 
rollers fed the paper into the developer, causing it to jam in the 
developer. 
The fuel cell 1 substack 3 differential voltage (A Volts) increased 
during reactant purging and gradually decreased between purges. 
The increase during purges was a few millivolts larger with each 
succeeding purge. This condition is indicative of reactant port 
plugging in one or more cells in substack 3. 
KSC: Removed and replaced fuel cell 1. 
RCS thruster L5D oxidizer and fuel injector temperatures stayed above 
220°P during the flight. Normally, these temperatures decrease below 
17S0P. Temperatures decreased steadily when heaters were turned off 
prior to entry operations. Possible failed-on 10W thruster heater. 
RSC: Remove and replace thruster LSD. 
The Mdular Auxiliary Data Systems ( M A E )  recorder failed to move when 
"Record" was initiated by IACO sending the " P M  ON" conrmand and the 
"WS ON" command at 107:09:03 G.m.t. The Recorder-Recording BITE 
(V78X9604) didn't go positive, indicating "Good" until 
107:09:09:37.5 G.m.t.; followed by the Recorder Tape Motion BITE 
(V78X9605E) indicating "Good" at 107:09:09:38.5 G.m.t. This is a delay 
of over 6 minutes. 
KSC: M A E  recorder replaced. 
1 
TABLE 111.- MSFC ELU3ENTS PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
Comments/Status 
The ET's intertank TPS application, effective ET-51 and subsequent, employs 
the use of two CPR foam spray guns which fill the valleys between the 
structural stringers and covers them in a single foam spray. 
Task I. Failure Investigation (Pending) 
Task 11. Corrective Action (Pending Investigation) 
Task 111 Clearance of Effectivities (ET-56, STS-55). Based on the 
previous flights of the same intertank configuration. 
The following applies: 
- Divots are within experience base 
- Evaluation of divots indicates shallow surface foam loss 
- Photographs do not indicate bondline concerns 
- No heating concern for intertank 
- Orbiter tile damage for STS-56 and other two-gun spray ET's 
is within flight experience base 
- STS-42 IFA resulted in a detailed review of spray process 
qualification, build and nonconformance paper for ET's 51, 
52, and 53. No definitive cause identified 
Task IV Cause and Corrective Action Sununary 
(Pending Investigation) 
Based on the effectivities discussion within Task 111, the problem was 
deferred on April 22, 1993 for the next six months in the Level 111 MSFC 
PRACA tracking system. This deferral presently covers flights STS-55, 
STS-57, STS-51, and STS-58. Deferred 
The scratched primary sealing surface was 0.58 inch from the forward 
edge of the aft dome boss ID at 55.8O and measured 0.040 inch long. Raised 
oetal was detected, however, no damage was found on any of the 
nozzle-to-case joint O-rings. Also, the damaged metal sealing surface 
did not affect the sealing function of the joint O-rings, vhich 
performed flawlessly during the flight. A mold impression of the scratch 
was taken and later measured at the laboratory. The measured impression 
reflected the scratch was 0.0003 inch deep with 0.0002 inch of raised metal 
This condition causes concern that the damged metal sealing surface could 
adversely affect seal function. Similar conditions have been observed on 
other recent flights. As a result, a "Scratch and Contamination 
Elimination" team was formed in Septerber 1992, consisting of principal 
%FC and RSRn contractor personnel. Since this trend has not been 
completely explained and continues to recur, the PRCB assigned this item 
as an in-flight anomaly with emphasis on a scratch team action to return 
with results and recomendations of their investigation. The culmination 
of the teams8 efforts determined appropriate recurrence control which has 
been inplemented in three areas: 
a. Operator awaremess and sensitivity: 
b. Communications: and 
c. Process reviews. 
Operator awarenes was heightened by the implementation of centralized 
training, eliminating contaminants and scratches through imprevement and 
standardization of operator understanding and skills. Co-ications 
improvement was realized by increasing the involvement of the work centers 
toward timely and effective PEAR closures. Finally, the process reviews 
Description 
A postflight review of 
the astronauts' hand-held 
camera film revealed 
approximately 10 rather 
large and unique divots 
of the ET-54 intertank 
acreage (-2 axis). 
During the postflight 
inspection of the left 
RSW( nozzle-to-case 
joint, a srall, axial 
scratch was observed on 
the aft dome boss primacy 
sealing surface at 55.E0. 
Problem 
1. STS-56-T-1 
2. STS-564-1 
Element 
External Tank 
Redesigned Solid 
Rocket Mtor 
TABLE 111.- MSFC ELU.IENFS PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
Comments/Status 
have resulted in improved general cleanliness practices (i-e., cleaning of 
workbenches, enhancements to handling and protection of hardware, better 
use of contamination clothing and tooling, and the use of lifting arrange- 
ments without weight test dates). The actions taken by this tema are 
adequate to minimize the occurrence of similar damage to future hardware. 
Since the enhancements are not effective until STS-60 (RSRM-35). it is 
possible that similar findings of contamination and scratches may be noted 
during the interim period. 
Several factors provide rationale for safe future flights during the 
interim period and beyond. (I) A preflight leak check provides positive 
verification of the joint's sealing capability. The nozzle-to-case joint's 
primary O-ring, secondary O-ring, and packings with retainers are tested 
at high pressure (920 _+ 10 psig) and at low pressure (30 _+ 3 psig) at low 
bolt torque and again at high pressure with high bolt torque. 
(2) The postflight assessment of the joint O-rings revealed no damage to 
to the seals because of the minimum surface flaw (0.0003 in. deep with 
0.0002 inch of raised metal. (3) The minimum O-ring footprint for the 
nozzle-to-case joint O-ring is 0.116 inch at 14.49 percent squeeze 
('lWR-50063). The minim footprint for the subject primary O-ring (as 
built) was 0.143 inch at 19.5 percent squeeze ('IWR-63650-31). The 
discussed scratch length of 0.040 inch violates only 35 percent of the 
mini- O-ring footprint. 
The in-flight anomaly was closed at the Level I1 PRCB (PRCBD No. S044895B) 
on May 20, 1993. The problem report was closed in the Level I11 NSFC 
PRACA tracking system for STS-57 and subsequent on May 20, 1993. Closed. 
The plunger and spring from holddoun post (HDP) 5 were found in the MLP 
support post after the launch. The plunger is designed to seal the 
exit bore within the debris containment device (DCD) to prevent 
potential debris from escaping into the SRB plume. This was the first 
occurrence of this type anomaly with the DCD design, which dates back 
to STS-26R (28 flights). 
The concern associated with this circumstance is that the plunger and 
spring become additional debris (not previously considered) during 
lift-off. A f4SPC/KSC/USBI anomaly tear was formed to better under- 
stand this failure and perform an investigation in the following 
areas: (1) Design and Analysis; (2) Loads and Environments; (3) Flight 
Hardware; and (4) Assembly and Installation. All affected components 
were tested and correct material properties were verified. Examination 
of the plunger shoulder fracture surfaces directed the investigation 
to conclude that the plunger failed in a multiple-event sequence. 
First, the plunger struck the top of the frangible nut halves, breaking 
off four sections at the edges (shoulder) of the flange cutouts. ~t 
has been demonstrated by test that a zero or near zero skewed firing 
contributes to frangible nut recontact with the plunger. The physical 
evidence indicates zero skew existed during the firing of the NASA 
standard detonators (USD). Second, the plunger impacted the spherical 
washer at the seating surface, causing the remaining edges of the 
plunger to fail. 
Description 
The left SRB aft skirt 
HW 5 plunger and spring 
escaped from the debris 
containment device (DCD) 
at lift-off. 
Problem 
STS-564-1 
(Continued) 
3. STS-56-51 
Element 
Solid Rocket 
Booster 
TABLE 111.- MSFC ELEMEKTS PROBLEH TRACKING LIST 
. 
Conunents/Status 
USBI and Rockwell International performed statistical analyses to 
determine the debris risk to the vehicle. The reliability of the 
plunger assembly operation on any given flight was determined to be 
0.9646. Rockwell reevaluated the probability of vehicle impact due to 
the additional debris (spring and plunger) and concluded the 
probability to be less than 0.054 percent. The analyses concluded that 
the reliability of the plunger systems in combination with the low 
probability of no HDP debris impact to the vehicle of 0.99998. 
Consequently, this problem is not considered a safety of flight issue. 
Since this incident was a random occurrence which presents very low 
probability of debris impact to the vehicle, no corrective action is 
required. It should also be noted that the affected harware involves 
non-reusable parts. The Level I1 IFA closure was accepted at the noon PRCB 
(PRCBD no. S044895A) on April 21, 1993. The problem report was 
subsequently closed in the Level I11 MSFC PRACA tracking system for STS-57, 
and subsequent on May 24, 1993. Closed. 
The aft compartment environment was believed to be different for this 
flow, and the reason has not yet been identified. All aft compartment 
parameters, both orbiter and SSME, have been reviewed, and no condition 
was observed that indicated any associated anomaly existed. It has 
been demonstrated (STS-26R FRF) that the AFV skin temperature are 
influenced by the aft compartment environment. 
After much discussion, an K C  deviation (PRCBD 72379DA) was written to 
implement a workaround for ME-1. The AFV skin temperatures 1 and 2 
and GO interface temperature were monitored from T-2 minute 55 seconds 
to T-31 seconds via RPS stripcharts for a 5°F terprature drop maximum to 
verify no leakage past the ME-1 anti-flood valve. 
The AN LCC limit ensures protection against oxidizer leakage. The LCC 
limit is set for 100" below the obserrved aft compartment temperature. The 
limit assures that no liquid oxidizer formation reaches the heat exchanger 
coil. Postflight inspection of the associated SSME hardware (skin tenper- 
ature sensors and/or purge ducts) revealed nominal conditions and config- 
uration. Efforts have been presently directed toward the Orbiter to deter- 
mine if any purges of the aft coapartment or vents from the drag chute 
coxpartment were different on STS-56. The investigation is continuing. 
The AN sensors from engine 2024 will be x-ray-inspected for possible 
bonding problems. It is not believed anything anomalous will be found, 
since the sensors provided nominal data during the flight. After 
inspection, the sensors will be removed and replaced as an added 
precautionary measure. The in-flight anomaly will not be addressed until 
the next two missions have flown (waiting for the Discovery flight, 
STS-51). This will help determine if this condition resulted from a 
problem with the sensors or Discovery's aft conpartment/environment, since 
engine 2024 is assigned to a different Orbiter (Columbia instead of 
Discovery). If the countdown and flight data from these missions establish 
the sensor or engines are not responsible, the SSME Project will recornmend 
that the in-flight anomaly either be transferred to Shuttle Integration, 
if appropriate, or be closed out as an unexplained anomaly. 
- we 
Description 
I)uring the propellant 
loading on STS-56, on 
April 6 and April 8, 1993 
both of the ME-1 
anti-flood valve skin 
temperature measurements 
read 60°F to 70°F warmer 
than normal. 
Problem 
3. STS-56-8-1 
(Continued) 
4. STS-56-E-1 
Element 
Space shuttle Main 
Engine 
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